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I am quite pleased to have this opportunity to comment on Robert
Post's provocative Lecture, Prejudicial Appearances.' Post's effort to dis-
tinguish the "dominant conception" of antidiscrimination law from what he
presents as a "sociological" account of the field intersects in striking ways
with my own efforts to analyze status relations and their disestablishment
from a sociohistorical vantage point. In this Response, I would like to
identify some key points of similarity and difference in our accounts, with
a view to furthering consideration of what we might learn from a socio-
logical approach to the field.
I have learned more than I can express from working with Robert Post
over the years, yet I still find myself startled-sometimes with exaspera-
tion, most often with delight-at the ways our intuitions about things of
this world diverge and converge. In the long tradition of our long argu-
ments, this Response begins by emphasizing an important difference in our
approaches to the question explored in his Lecture, and winds up identify-
ing a deep ground of methodological agreement between us.
As I explore in the first Part of this Response, my own efforts to
model antidiscrimination law from a dynamic, or sociohistorical, vantage
point take as central to the field the problem of social stratification, a con-
cept missing from Post's sociological account. In the remainder of this
Response, I argue that one needs a concept of social stratification-of
status inequality among groups arising out of the interaction of social
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structure and social meaning-in order to make sense of the blindness
trope at the heart of antidiscrimination law.
In Part II of this Response, I offer such an account-an account that
demonstrates how color blindness discourse functions as a semantic code
and then illustrates how this semantic code can be used to characterize
practices in ways that may either disrupt or rationalize social stratification.
Color blindness discourse may offer symbolic or expressive testimony of
this society's desire to achieve neutrality in matters of race relations, but, I
argue, color blindness discourse cannot itself generate a positive account of
what race-neutrality would look like in practice. The conviction that color
blindness discourse does offer such positive, practical guidance generally
reflects views about the social nature of race that are entirely independent
of the conceptual premises of color blindness discourse.
Part III of this Response continues this sociohistorical analysis of
color blindness discourse, examining how color blindness discourse works
to disrupt or rationalize social stratification over time and under changing
sociohistorical conditions. Here I consider how sociohistorical inquiry
might illuminate the familiar debate between antidiscrimination and
antisubordination principles that for more than two decades has dominated
arguments about equality in popular, academic, and judicial fora. I argue
that a sociological account of antidiscrimination law-that attends to ques-
tions of group inequality as well as to the ways that the practices and
meanings that sustain group inequality evolve as they are contested-can
teach us much more about the underlying purposes of antidiscrimination
law than Post's Lecture suggests. On my account, a commitment to allevi-
ating stratification is and has been central to the project of antidiscrimina-
tion law since the beginning of the Second Reconstruction. But the very
method of analysis that demonstrates the centrality of this normative
commitment to the antidiscrimination project simultaneously reveals
the limitations of meta-principles (such as "antidiscrimination" or
"antisubordination") in guiding our critical practices. In short, on my
account, sociohistorical analysis reveals both the utility and the limits of
meta-principles that might guide positive and normative analysis of equal-
ity.
In the final analysis, I concur with Post's view-so compellingly
argued in his First Amendment scholarship-that a meta-principle
abstracted from social practice cannot help us resolve many of the most
pressing and controverted questions in law. At its best, a sociological, or
sociohistorical, account of the problems addressed by antidiscrimination
law reveals to us the nest of more particularized positive and normative
questions to which tropes of blindness often blind us. At the end of the day,
we must forge answers to these questions in history: as we argue over the
justice of particular social relations, particular social practices, and
[Vol. 88:77
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particular social meanings, and as such conflicts produce changes in the
very relations, practices, and meanings that sustain status inequality over
time.
I
SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO DISCRIMINATION
This Response opens with a brief sketch of Post's Lecture that cannot
possibly do its full argument justice but does, I hope, identify the basic
analytical framework that Post has identified as a "sociological" account of
antidiscrimination law. I then draw upon my own prior work to sketch, in
similarly brief terms, a sociohistorical account of antidiscrimination law
that diverges from Post's in one especially crucial dimension. On my
account, the concept of social stratification is key to understanding antidis-
crimination law and color blindness discourse, as I then undertake to dem-
onstrate in the remaining Parts of this Response.
A. Post's Account of Antidiscrimination Law
In Prejudicial Appearances, Post offers an account of the "dominant
conception" of antidiscrimination law derived from the case law itself.
Antidiscrimination law, he observes, "seeks to neutralize widespread forms
of prejudice that pervasively disadvantage persons based upon inaccurate
judgments about their worth or capacities"2 by "eliminating or carefully
scrutinizing the use of stigmatizing characteristics as a ground for
judgment."3 As the Supreme Court explains: "In passing Title VII,
Congress made the simple but momentous announcement that sex, race,
religion, and national origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or
compensation of employees."4
Antidiscrimination law thus requires employers "to make decisions as
if their employees did not exhibit forbidden characteristics, as if, for
example, employees had no race or sex."5 "This," Post observes, "is what
underwrites the important trope of 'blindness' . . . . Blindness renders
forbidden characteristics invisible; it requires employers to base their
judgments instead upon the deeper and more fundamental ground of
'individual merit' or 'intrinsic worth."' 6 The law would have employers
judge employees on the basis of what it deems to be relevant, rational, and
legitimate criteria-the employee's ability to perform the job. As the Court
observed in Griggs, "Congress has not commanded that the less qualified
be preferred over the better qualified simply because of minority origins.
2. Id. at 8.
3. Id. at 9.
4. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
5. Post, supra note 1, at 11.
6. Id.
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Far from disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made such
qualifications the controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and
sex become irrelevant. 7
In passing, Post questions whether law ought to encourage employers
to apprehend their employees in such purely instrumental terms,8 but his
challenge to the field is more fundamental. In Prejudicial Appearances,
Post contends that antidiscrimination law does not and cannot cause
employers to make judgments about qualifications in a manner that is
completely race and sex-blind: "Law is made by the very persons who
participate in the social practices that constitute race, gender, and beauty. It
would be astonishing, therefore, if American antidiscrimination law could
transcend these categories, if it could operate in a way that rendered them
truly irrelevant."
On Post's "sociological" account of the field, antidiscrimination law
instead "alter[s] the norms by which sex is given social meaning.""'
Enforcement of the employment discrimination statute does not eliminate
"'the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting
from sex stereotypes,'"" at least if "stereotypes" are understood as Post
defines them-"the conventions that underwrite the social practice of
gender."' 2 Instead, as Post illustrates through an analysis of the cases
enforcing Title VII's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
sex, 3 Title VII interacts with "gender practices... in a selective man-
ner."' 4 The case law interpreting Title VII bars many gender-specific
employment practices, but it authorizes others-notoriously, the enforce-
ment of gender-specific dress and grooming codes, 5 and gender-specific
job assignments intended to protect customer privacy interests.'6 In short,
enforcement of the federal employment discrimination statute may disrupt
and transform existing gender norms, but it does not wholly obliterate
them.
This, Post argues, is as it should be. On the sociological account, the
law "does not ask whether 'stereotypic impressions' can be eliminated tout
court, but rather how the law alters and modifies such impressions.""
Antidiscrimination law is a "social practice, which regulates other social
7. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,436 (197 1).
8. See Post, supra note 1, at 13-14.
9. Id. at 17.
10. Id. at 20.
11. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180 (1981) (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, n.13 (1978)) (emphasis removed).
12. Post, supra note 1, at 18.
13. See id. at 18-30.
14. Id. at 26.
15. See id. at 24-29.
16. See id. at 25-26.
17. ld. at 31.
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practices"; courts should therefore strive to "reshape [race and gender] in
ways that reflect the purposes of the law."' 8
Post goes on to offer reasons, apart from simple descriptive accuracy,
for embracing this "sociological" account of antidiscrimination law over
the "dominant conception" of the field. 9 But before assessing those rea-
sons, I would like first to consider how Post's sociological account of the
field both converges with and diverges from my own.
B. Supplementing the Sociological Account: Stratification in
Sociohistorical Perspective
For some years now, I have used legal-historical methods to explore
problems in antidiscrimination law. When I first turned to history, it was to
explore changes in race and gender relations during periods when conver-
sation about social status was far more explicit than it is today. But, as I
began to examine the changing structure of gender and race relations in
late nineteenth-century America, it occurred to me that I was examining a
historical moment that is in important respects not unlike our own. In the
aftermath of the Civil War, the nation began to experiment with disestab-
lishing race and gender inequality. Law reform in this era sought to make
whites and blacks more equal before the law, and in more halting ways, to
affirm notions of sex equality, particularly in marriage. By looking at how
the legal system began to disestablish gender and race inequality in the
nineteenth century, we can learn something about the operations of antidis-
crimination law today.
With questions of this sort in view, I have explored changes in the
regulation of reproduction, violence, work, suffrage, and citizenship in the
period after the Civil War.2 For the purposes of this Response, I will draw
18. Id. at 17.
19. See id. at 30-40.
20. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equaly Right. Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in
MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 43 (Martha
Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995) [hereinafter Siegel, Abortion as Equality Right]; Reva
B. Siegel, Collective Memory and the Nineteenth Amendment: Reasoning About "the Woman
Question" in the Discourse of Sex Discrimination, in HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE LAW 131 (Austin
Sarat ed., forthcoming 1999) [hereinafter Siegel, Collective Memory]; Reva B. Siegel, Home as
Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE
LJ. 1073 (1994) [hereinafter Siegel, Home as Work]; Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: An
Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv.
261 (1992) [hereinafter Siegel, Reasoning from the Body]; Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of
Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994)
[hereinafter Siegel, Modernization]; Reva B. Siegel, The Racial Rhetorics of Colorblind
Constitutionalism: The Case of Hopwood v. Texas, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AMRMATIVE
ACTION 29 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998) [hereinafter Siegel, Colorblind
Constitutionalism]; Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) [hereinafter Siegel, Rule of Love]; Reva B. Siegel, Valuing
Housework: Nineteenth-Century Anxieties About the Commodification of Domestic Labor, 41 AM.
BEHAV. SCI. 1437 (1998); Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving
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from my work several observations about the nature of race and sex dis-
crimination, sociohistorically considered. This exercise will reveal
deep grounds of agreement with the sociological account Post offers in
Prejudicial Appearances, but it will also expose some important grounds
of difference.
Post describes antidiscrimination law as a social practice that regu-
lates the social practices of race and gender, altering the conventions that
give such practices meaning.2 While this is a helpful account, it is also ter-
ribly abstract and silent about certain fundamental features of the under-
taking.
Considered concretely, antidiscrimination law regulates the social
practices that sustain the relative social position of whites and blacks, men
and women. A bit more abstractly, we might say that antidiscrimination
law regulates the social practices that sustain group inequality. The group
inequalities that concern antidiscrimination law are typically those that are
socially pervasive (articulated across social domains) and socially persis-
tent (articulated over time). When inequality among groups is structurally
pervasive and persistent in this way, we typically refer to it as a condition
of social stratification.'
When we analyze race and gender inequality from a historical stand-
point, we encounter relations of group inequality embedded in the social
organization of work, reproduction, and sexuality as such activities are
structured in institutions such as slavery, the market, or marriage. Indeed,
from the standpoint of history, what is perhaps most visible is the sheer
heterogeneity of institutions, practices, stories, and reasons that sustain the
unequal social position of different groups over time. Couched a bit more
abstractly, we might say that social stratification is constituted through
features of (1) social structure (institutions or practices) and (2) social
meaning (stories or reasons). The elements of social structure and social
meaning that sustain stratification vary by group and within groups, and
they evolve over time as their legitimacy is contested. In short, when con-
sidered from a historical standpoint, discrimination has no transcontextual
or fixed form.'
Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997) [hereinafter Siegel, Equal
Protection].
21. See Post, supra note 1, at 16-30.
22. For an overview of some of the recent sociological literature on stratification, see SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION: CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (David B. Grusky ed.,
1994).
23. See, e.g., Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 20, at 1119; Siegel, Modernization, supra note
20, at 2210-11; Siegel, Rule of Love, supra note 20, at 2179. In other words, I reject the legal-formalist
assumption that, through abstract ("principled") reasoning, we can adduce the kinds of social groups at
which discrimination is directed or the kinds of social forms it assumes. Rather, these understandings
emerge through social struggle, as various features of social stratification are contested over time.
[Vol. 88:77
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A look at history discloses that the network of institutions, practices,
and meanings that support social stratification varies by group, and within
groups as well. There are a variety of institutions (e.g., market, family),
practices (e.g., separation, role differentiation) and reasons (e.g., degrada-
tion, paternalism) employed to enforce the different social status of groups.
And because persons are members of multiple status groups, there may
well be considerable variation in the institutions, practices, and meanings
that regulate the social position of different members of one group.
24
Furthermore, the institutions, practices, and reasons that support
group stratification vary over time as their legitimacy is contested. At any
point in history, a society may view inequality in the distribution of social
goods as lawful or illicit, just or unjust. Inequality in the distribution of
material and dignitary goods among groups is periodically contested, and
when the legitimacy of a particular distributive regime is successfully
challenged, status-enforcing practices often evolve in rule structure and
rationale, a dynamic I have called "preservation-through-transformation." '
Successful challenges to the legitimacy of a distributive regime redefine
what counts as a fair or just practice or rationale for allocating social
goods, and practices and reasons once thought reasonable are thus periodi-
cally recharacterized as wrongful. 6
Since the Civil War, the American legal system has played an
increasingly self-conscious role in regulating the distributive regimes that
sustain group stratification. Of course, law works both to disestablish and
to legitimate the distributive regimes that sustain group stratification. Con-
sider, for example, the transition from slavery to segregation. As law con-
fers formal equality on groups, it disturbs the institutions, practices, and
meanings that maintain social stratification, and, to the extent it does so,
incremental changes in the relative social position of groups may result.27
"Discrimination" and "prejudice" are names that we use to brand as illegitimate, practices and reasons
that American society once viewed as perfectly legitimate.
24. See, e.g., Siegel, Abortion as Equality Righ supra note 20, at 58-59 (observing that the
nineteenth-century campaign to criminalize abortion focused on birth-control practices of privileged
women, and cautioning that it is important to ascertain the class and race salience of reproductive
regulation, which can be "birth-compelling or birth-deternng in form"); Siegel, Home as Work, supra
note 20, at 1189-1205 (observing that during the Reconstruction era, when the woman's rights
movement began to assert that wives' household labor inhibited them from attaining equality with their
husbands, the movement's leadership advocated a reorganization of the family sphere in which women
would perform household labor on a collective basis, with poor working women performing manual
aspects of household labor for pay under the direction of "educated" women); Siegel, Rule of Love,
supra note 20, at 2134-41, 2150-70 (observing that during the Reconstruction era, the legal system
punished at the whipping post poor and minority men accused of wifebeating, while extending privacy-
based immunities to more privileged men accused of similar conduct).
25. Siegel, Rule of Love, supra note 20, at 2175-88.
26. See, e.g., Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 20, at 1146-48.
27. See generally id. (illustrating how, during both the First and Second Reconstruction,
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause disturbed and preserved the subordinate social position of
African Americans); Siegel, Colorblind Constitutionalism, supra note 20, at 48-57 (tracing discourse of
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II
ANALYZING COLOR BLINDNESS THROUGH THE LENS OF STRATIFICATION
When the sociological account of antidiscrimination law that Post
offers in Prejudicial Appearances is elaborated in these ways, we can say
something more about how the practice of "blindness" works to transform
and preserve relations of race and gender inequality. The concept of strati-
fication or group inequality that is missing from Post's account plays a key
role here. One needs a concept of social stratification, of status inequality
among groups arising out of the interaction of social structure and social
meaning, in order to make sense of the blindness trope at the heart
of antidiscrimination law. For "[i]t is the social condition of racial
stratification that makes the concept of colorblindness intelligible as a
distributive principle."2 When we say we are distributing goods and
opportunities in a race- and gender-blind fashion, we recognize group
identity but ignore the ordinary status consequences of group identity for
purposes of the relevant social transaction?9 Differently put, blindness
tropes are concerned with counteracting the normal status-linked benefits
and detriments of group membership."
Even so, practices of group-blind distribution generally alleviate
group stratification without eradicating it. How is this so? The blindness
trope is, as I have argued, no less a legal fiction than the doctrine of marital
unity or the concept of equality in the eyes of the law." As I will now
illustrate, instability and slippage in discourses of race and gender, as well
as the idiom of discrimination itself, allow this society to embrace princi-
ples of group-blind distribution without disestablishing group stratification.
In short, antidiscrimination law contains its own complex mode of repre-
senting race and gender and of representing their transcendence, and these
representations play a crucial part in the social construction of race and
gender. 2
racial privacy during the First and Second Reconstructions, and illustrating how an understanding of
racial equality at law in each era presupposed the perpetuation of racial inequality in social fact). For an
account of changes in gender status law during this period, see Siegel, Rule of Love, supra note 20.
28. Siegel, Colorblind Constitutionalism, supra note 20, at 51.
29. See id.
30. Cf. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REv. 339, 354 (1949) (proposing doctrines of "suspect classification" and "rigid scrutiny" whose
"content, at any particular time, will depend upon the area in which the principle of equality is
struggling against the recurring forms of claims to special and unequal status-whether along racial,
religious, economic, or even political, lines").
31. See Reva B. Siegel, In the Eves of the Law: Reflections on the Authority of Legal Discourse,
in LAW's STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 225, 227 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz
eds., 1996).
32. Cf. MICHAEL OM! & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORIATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM
THE 1960S TO THE 1990s, at 55-56 (2d ed. 1994) (advocating an approach to "racial formation" that
understands race as growing out of interaction of "both social structure and cultural representation").
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In the ensuing discussion I will first illustrate the important role that
representational conventions play in debates over the legitimacy of dis-
tributive practices, and then proceed to consider in more detail how the
discourse of color blindness itself works to disrupt and to rationalize the
practices that sustain group inequality.
A. Representational Conventions in Debates About the
Legitimacy of Distributive Practices
Debates over the practices that sustain group inequality generate their
own representational conventions-representations of the social groups in
question as well as of those aspects of social structure and social meaning
that sustain the groups' relative social status. For example, even those with
no formal training in law understand that "crack cocaine" is a "race
neutral" concept in the criminal justice system, but race-identified in social
practice. Similarly they understand that "domestic labor," "child care,"
"rape," and "single parent" are "gender neutral" in law and gender-
identified in social practice. Given the explosive questions about distribu-
tion that drive debates about the legitimacy of the practices that sustain
group inequality, it is not terribly surprising that a society would develop
specialized ways of arguing about the justice of its social practices and the
modes of regulation to which they are properly subject. More striking is
the way that linguistically competent actors-with and without formal
training in law-manipulate these representational conventions in debates
about the justice of distributive practices. Those engaged in argument con-
tinually exploit semantic instability in the positive and normative terms
employed to characterize groups and practices, yet participants in the
debate appear to be only intermittently cognizant of the degree to which
this is so.
To start with a seemingly simple case, what does it mean when we say
that a rule classifies "on the basis of' race or sex? We often talk as if the
meaning of this claim were transparent and uncontroverted; in fact it is not.
Sometimes the Supreme Court reasons that for a rule to classify on the
basis of sex, the rule must apply only to group members; but sometimes the
Court reasons that the rule must apply to all group members. For example,
in equal protection doctrine, the Court uses this dodge to avoid character-
izing policies concerning pregnant women as sex-based,33 so that, in the
eyes of the law, abortion policies are not?' Along similar lines, the
33. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974) ("The program divides potential
recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is
exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes.").
34. See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 271 (1993) ("'While it is
true... that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification
concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification."' (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. at 484,496
n.20)) (reaffirming Geduldig and applying its holding that classifications pertaining to pregnancy are
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"sex-plus" doctrine, which currently protects sex-specific grooming and
dress codes, holds that policies that apply to some but not all group mem-
bers do not classify on the basis of sex, unless they concern an immutable
trait or a fundamental right?5 On this account, employers may prohibit
women from wearing pants or men from wearing dresses without discrimi-
nating on the basis of sex.36 (Discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion can be expressed in sex-plus terms-as, for example, a refusal to hire
men who desire men-but courts simply exclude homophobic hiring crite-
ria from the ambit of sex-plus doctrine, on the grounds that courts should
not extend Title VII to forms of discrimination that Congress did not intend
to prohibit.)37
Yet as we examine the characterization of practices as distinct from
rules, we discover that practices that pertain to some, but not all, group
members are often characterized as discriminating "on the basis of sex."
Consider, for example, sexual harassment doctrine. A man makes overtures
to a woman. By reason of a heterosexual presumption, coupled with what
Kenji Yoshino terms a monosexual presumption,38 courts assume that a
putative harasser will make such overtures only to women. 9 Still it flies in
the face of social understanding to say that he would make such overtures
to all women. (Early on, sex-plus doctrine supplied a defense to claims of
sexual harassment.)' ° Even if he did so, the law would not characterize
such behavior as "discriminating" ''on the basis of sex" unless the
not necessarily sex-based to abortion in the course of interpreting animus provision of civil rights
statute).
35. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975).
36. See, e.g., Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1391 (W.D.Mo. 1979)
(applying "sex-plus" doctrine to uphold discharge of female employee who violated dress code by
wearing a pantsuit, reasoning that "plaintiff's affection for pantsuits is not an 'immutable
characteristic"'); cf. Devine v. Lonschein, 621 F. Supp. 894, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("At least until that
dreadful day when unisex identity of dress and appearance arrives, judicial officers ... are entitled to
some latitude in differentiating between male and female attorneys, within the context of decorous
professional behavior and appearance.").
37. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1979) ("We must
again reject appellants' efforts to 'bootstrap' Title VII protection for homosexuals.... [W]hether
dealing with men or women the employer is using the same criterion: it will not hire or promote a
person who prefers sexual partners of the same sex. Thus this policy does not involve different
decisional critera for the sexes.").
38. Courts assume that the harasser is either heterosexual or homosexual, but not bisexual. See
Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb.
2000).
39. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) ("Courts and juries
have found the inference of discrimination easy to draw in most male-female sexual harassment
situations, because the challenged conduct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual
activity; it is reasonable to assume those proposals would not have been made to someone of the same
sex.").
40. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990-91 & n.57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing sex-plus
cases and attempting to distinguish problem of sexual harassment).
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recipient, by her conduct, communicated that it was unwelcome.4 Recent
debates over harassment law merely drive to the surface the socially con-
tingent act of characterization that occurs whenever we make judgments
about practices that we claim discriminate on the basis of race or sex-a
problem already familiar to us in debates over the concept of discrimina-
tory intent4 2
So when we say that an employer does not discriminate on the basis
of race or sex, what exactly are we saying? As a doctrinal matter, it turns
out that we are saying many different, and sometimes contradictory,
things-and these terms are likely to have still other meanings to persons
not familiar with some of the more arcane ways doctrine characterizes
social practices. Yet color- and gender-blind discourse is more than inde-
terminate; it is partial. Race and gender stratification is sustained by many
social practices and reasons, but antidiscrimination law constrains and
delegitimates only some of them.43 A society may thus embrace group-
blind practices of distribution that alter without eradicating the social strati-
fication of groups.
B. Color Blindness: Representing Race in Debates over
Practices that Sustain Group Inequality
Once we begin to attend to the highly specialized ways in which
antidiscrimination law represents race and discrimination, we can describe
more precisely how color blindness discourse both constrains and legiti-
mates practices that maintain racial stratification. To this end, I will first
examine the distinctive ways in which tropes of race are employed in
claims about color blindness, and then consider how this rhetorical system
is used to characterize the social practices that enforce and perpetuate the
differential status of racial groups. This analysis will demonstrate how
color blindness discourse works both to destabilize and to rationalize social
stratification.
41. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) ("The gravamen of any sexual
harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome."' (quoting 29 CFR §
1604.1 l(a) (1985))). Opponents of affirmative action such as Justice Scalia are the first to emphasize
that gender-differentiating conduct is a necessary but not sufficient condition for liability in the sexual
harassment context; the putatively harassing conduct must still be judged unwelcome, offensive, or
pervasive before a court will declare that it discriminates on the basis of sex. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at
81 (holding that Title ViI "does not reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and
women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex. The prohibition of
harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids
only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the 'conditions' of the victim's employment").
42. See, e.g., Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 20, at 1141 n.57 (discussing the literature
criticizing discriminatory purpose doctrine).
43. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 25-27, 33-37 and infra text accompanying notes 7 1-
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In order to illustrate the specialized, and often contradictory, ways
that antidiscrimination law makes assertions about "race" as it evaluates
the justice of our distributive practices, I will be working with some usage
distinctions Neil Gotanda identifies in his influential article, A Critique of
"Our Constitution is Color-Blind."' Gotanda observes that the meaning of
the term "race" varies significantly in Supreme Court cases, and in ways
that the Court does not generally acknowledge. Gotanda identifies four
very different modes of talking about "race" in the antidiscrimination case
law, which he calls "status-race," "formal-race," "historical-race," and
"culture-race."'45 "Status-race" refers to the kinds of claims about race that
the law might link to stereotypes, prejudice, or racism. "Formal-race" is the
mode of talking about race that civil rights law has developed to oppose
status-race claims; "formal-race" claims attempt to counteract status-race
claims by practices of "racial nonrecognition" or color blindness premised
on the view that race is socially and morally irrelevant, a matter of appear-
ance or skin color only. "Historical-race" is the way courts talk about race
when describing differences in the social situation of racial groups or their
individual members that are attributable to past or current discrimination.
By contrast, "culture-race" approaches differences in the outlook and
mores of racial groups or their individual members as more lasting features
of group identity, treating race as a species of ethnicity, a concept at work
when racial difference is celebrated as a form of diversity or otherwise
judged by critics such as Dinesh D'Souza.46
While the ensuing discussion will explore shifting legal usages of the
term "race," I note at the outset that one could extend Gotanda's analysis
of the different forms of racial rhetoric to the case of gender, especially if
one is looking for gender analogues to the concept of "formal-race" and
the practice of color blindness or racial nonrecognition. For example, in
ruling that gender-based peremptory strikes in jury selection are unconsti-
tutional, Justice O'Connor observed: "We know that like race, gender
matters. ... [O]ne need not be a sexist to share the intuition that in certain
cases a person's gender and resulting life experience will be relevant to his
or her view of the case."47 Yet she acknowledged that "[tioday's decision
severely limits a litigant's ability to act on this intuition, for the import of
our holding is that any correlation between a juror's gender and attitudes is
44. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991).
45. Id. at 3-4.
46. See id. at 4. For contrasting usage of the culture-race concept, compare Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-19 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (reasoning that
race may be used as a factor in educational admissions to enhance the diversity of the student body),
with Siegel, Colorblind Constitutionalisn4 supra note 20, at 52-55 (discussing commentators such as
Dinesh d'Souza who argue that racial hierarchy reflects the cultural "merits" of different racial groups).
47. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 148-49 (1994) (O'Connor. J., concurring).
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irrelevant as a matter of constitutional law."4 Restrictions on the peremp-
tory challenge, in matters of gender as in matters of race, amount to "a
special rule of relevance, a statement about what this Nation stands for,
rather than a statement of fact."' 9 In this passage, Justice O'Connor is
unusually forthright in acknowledging multiple and specialized modes of
talking about race and gender in the case law. Most commonly, antidis-
crimination discourse slides-sometimes unconsciously, sometimes
adventitiously-from formal to historical or cultural discourses about race
and gender, and back again."'
It is by observing how these different modes of race talk interact in
doctrinal claims about race discrimination that we can begin to understand
how color blindness discourse functions as a semantic code. But to crack
the code, we first need to consider more carefully how each of these modes
of race talk supports or undermines claims about the instrumental rational-
ity of regulatory decisions, claims that-as Robert Post has observed-
now dominate color blindness talk." Questions concerning the instrumen-
tal rationality of regulatory decisions have come to dominate color blind-
ness discourse as it has been doctrinally elaborated in the Second
Reconstruction because of the particular legal-process rationale through
which antidiscrimination law has justified judicial review of such deci-
sions." When antidiscrimination law asks whether discrimination has
48. Id. at 149.
49. Id. (quoting Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 941-42 (1986)).
50. See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 44, at 36-52 (observing the movement between "formal" and
"historical" usages of race in debates concerning race-conscious measures such as affirmative action);
Siegel, Colorblind Constitutionalism, supra note 20, at 41-47 (illustrating how the decision in
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). employs contradictory uses of race in the course of
analyzing diversity and remedial justifications for affirmative action).
51. See Post, supra note 1, at 13-15.
52. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 713-15 (1985)
("The Carolene solution is to seize the high ground of democratic theory and establish that the
challenged legislation was produced by a highly defective process.") (observing that the current
rationale for judicial protection of minority rights was developed at a time when the Supreme Court
was repudiating constitutional doctrines restricting New-Deal legislation and was therefore preoccupied
with the counter-majoritarian difficulty). To appreciate how this legal-process narrative translates
questions of discrimination into problems of intrumental rationality, see, for example, Gerald Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1972) ("Modest interventionism
would certainly differ from the 'all-out tolerance' of the old equal protection and from the attitude of
the hands off due process era. It would place a greater burden on the state to come forth with
explanations about the contributions of its means to its ends. But that demand would reinforce, not
conflict with ... the Court's modern role [in] safeguarding the structure of the political process ....
Means scrutiny ... can improve the quality of the political process-without second-guessing the
substantive validity of its results .. "). For accounts that situate the preoccupations of the legal process
school in the larger intellectual movements of the post-World War II era, see MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 250-68
(1992); EDWARD A. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE
PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973); Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
561 (1988); cf. Post, supra note 1, at 14 and n.69 (tracing the blindness trope in antidiscrimination law
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occurred, it typically inquires whether the challenged action differentiates
among persons "rationally," examining how persons are grouped or classi-
fied with respect to "traits" that might be "relevant" to the "purpose" of the
regulatory action or law. 3 For this reason, I would now like to examine in
somewhat more detail the different forms of race talk Gotanda has identi-
fied, and then to consider how antidiscrimination law moves among these
usages as it makes claims about the instrumental rationality, and distribu-
tive justice, of regulatory decisions.
Gotanda calls the mode of speaking about race associated with white
supremacy or racial prejudice "status-race."' Status-race claims are the
conventional ascriptive claims about race that justify a status regime. We
might note some additional characteristics of status-race claims. Status-
race claims are often group-categorical; that is, they often attribute traits
exclusively to members of one racial group or another. In their most con-
ventional form, status-race claims differentiate superordinate and subordi-
nate groups by attributing to members of each group opposing traits that
help explain their relative social status.55 Thus, a familiar status-race claim
is that whites are hardworking and blacks are lazy.56 Status-race claims
assume that race is a simple and sensible basis for explaining and organiz-
ing social relationships.
Formal-race talk arises as part of this society's effort to delegitimate
status-race claims,57 and is the mode of talking about race that we associate
with civil rights law and color blindness. A familiar assertion within
to a Rawisian conception of justice; further noting that Rawls interprets the concept of rationality
appropriate to the original position in economic terms, as a question concerning "the most effective
means to given ends").
53. For the foundational statement of this approach, see Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 30, at
347 (presenting discrimination as a problem concerning the instrumental rationality of classifications,
and offering a now-famous series of diagrams that "make it possible to assess the rationality of
regulatory means given a stipulated regulatory purpose"). For an overview of some of the key cases
and law review articles that translated this "legal-process" approach to discrimination into the strict-
scrutiny framework that still governs the review of claims of race discrimination, see PAUL BRtEST &
SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 554-
79 (3d ed. 1992) (excerpting, inter alia, articles by Tussman & tenBroek, John Ely, and Gerald
Gunther).
54. Gotanda, supra note 44, at 37.
55. For a detailed account of a status regime as an interlocking series of social meanings, see
especially J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2321-35 (1997).
56. Cf. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1370-74 (1988) (identifying a series
of binary oppositions that help constitute the social meaning of white and black); see also J.M. BALKIN,
CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 216-18,230-34 (1998) (discussing binary coding and
nested oppositions that constitute race and gender). Not all status-race talk functions to differentiate
members of superordinate and subordinate groups. Some status-race talk distinguishes among members
of the subordinate group, identifying types who together constitute the group and so explain its
subordinate social status. Status-race talk of this variety applies exclusively to group members,
although to some but not all group members (for example, "the Uncle Tom" or "the uppity nigger").
57. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
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formal-race discourse is: "It is wrong to discriminate on the basis of race
because the mere fact of race or skin color has no moral or social
relevance." Like status-race talk, formal-race talk reasons about race in
group-categorical terms. Formal-race talk assumes that race is a biological
or physiological trait that all individuals possess and by which they can be
differentiated into groups.58 Yet, unlike status-race talk and in direct oppo-
sition to it, formal-race talk insists that race is a trait that has no social
relevance. 9 On this view, it is irrational to distinguish persons by race.
A society intent on repudiating conventional status-based under-
standings of race does have other modes of talking about race. The modes
of speech Gotanda identifies as "historical-race" and "culture-race" are two
of these. These modes of reasoning view race as a social formation, that is,
as an aggregation of traits of potential social relevance. Historical-race
understands the traits of racial groups as contingent, as arising out of a
status system that is being dismantled over time. This mode of talking
about race typically focuses on injuries sustained by members of subordi-
nated groups." By contrast, culture-race is that mode of talking that treats
race as akin to ethnicity, as involving the distinctive forms of life that
social groups work out over time.6' In self-conscious opposition to status-
race talk, historical-race claims and culture-race claims understand the
traits that constitute race as group-salient and not group-categorical, as
traits that are unevenly distributed in society and correlate closely, but by
no means precisely, with racial group membership.
Now let us look more carefully at the special kinds of claims that
color blindness or formal-race discourse makes about race, so that we can
appreciate how color blindness claims interact with other modes of rea-
soning about race in arguments over the legitimacy of distributive prac-
tices. Color blindness or formal-race discourse is in fact a highly
specialized form of race talk that shares some features in common with the
status-race usages it was developed to combat. As we have seen, from the
standpoint of formal-race discourse, race is a fixed yet radically empty
feature of every person's identity. Like traditional biological conceptions
of race, formal-race discourse views race as an empirically determinate
feature of persons, but unlike traditional biological conceptions of race,
formal-race discourse asserts that race has no socially relevant content. For
58. Paradoxically, color blindness discourse frequently assserts that the only real, although
morally and socially irrelevant, aspect of race is appearance, "the mere color of one's skin."
59. See Gotanda, supra note 44, at 6 ("Formal-race implies that 'Black' and 'White' are mere
racial classification labels, unconnected to social realities.").
60. See id. at 40 ("[uIn historical-race usage, racial categories describe relations of oppression
and unequal power. Historical-race usage of Black does not have the same meaning as usage of
white: Black is the reification of subordination; white is the reification of privilege and
supererdination.").
61. See id. at 56 ("Culture-race includes all aspects of culture, community, and consciousness.").
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example, in Hopwood v. Texas,62 the Fifth Circuit quotes Richard Posner
asserting this basic tenet of the color blindness creed: "'[T]he use of a
racial characteristic to establish a presumption that the individual also
possesses other, and socially relevant, characteristics, exemplifies,
encourages, and legitimizes the mode of thought and behavior that
underlies most prejudice and bigotry in modem America."" In the court's
view, "[t]he use of race, in and of itself, to choose students simply achieves
a student body that looks different. Such a criterion is no more rational on
its own terms than would be choices based upon the physical size or blood
type of applicants."6" Conversely, within color blindness or formal-race
discourse, to judge persons "without regard to race" is to judge persons on
the basis of socially relevant or meritocratic criteria, or to judge them "as
individuals." On this view, "individuals" possess skills and talents and
diverse forms of cultural literacy, and any of these features may legiti-
mately form the basis for rational or meritocratic judgments about them."-
Color blindness discourse views these various socially relevant properties
of individuals (including even certain aspects of their accent and appear-
ance) as distinct and distinguishable from "race" as such. Thus, the
Hopwood court reasons that "[w]hile the use of race per se is proscribed,
state-supported schools may reasonably consider a host of other factors-
some of which may have some correlation with race-in making
admissions decisions."66
Within color blindness discourse, the concept of the "individual" does
two kinds of work. The discourse of individualism signifies a particular
kind of claim about race-neutrality, referring to those characteristics of
persons apart from their formal-race. This concept of neutrality, in turn,
supports a particular view of distributive fairness: providing opportunities
to persons "without regard to race," that is, on the basis of "merit" or
"qualifications," "achieved" rather than "ascriptive" characteristics. It is
crucial to note that, within color blindness discourse, the right to be treated
as an "individual" entitles persons to protection from classification on
the basis of formal-race only. 7 It is understood to be the essence of
62. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
63. Id. at 946 (quoting Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of
Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. C. REv. 1, 12).
64. Id. at 945.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
66. Id. at 946.
67. The objection to classifying persons on the basis of group membership pertains to
classifications on the basis of formal-race only. Consider this typical objection to affirmative action:
If race should be the basis for the allocation of society's goods and opportunities, and if racial
groups matter more than individuals, then we must accept affirmative action as it has
evolved, even if such acceptance requires us to jettison the best in the American tradition.
Race cannot serve this purpose, however, because the mere fact of a person's race is morally
uninteresting.
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meritocratic rationality, or so-called "equality of opportunity," to classify
persons with respect to "socially relevant characteristics" which are taken
as goods, or proxies for goods, in themselves. Thus, the Hopwood opinion
deems it an affront to meritocratic ordering to take into account Cheryl
Hopwood's race, but perfectly reasonable to discount her grade point aver-
age by taking into consideration the fact that she attended a community
college and a state university.68 Indeed, on this understanding of "equality
of opportunity," it is the essence of "individualism" to categorize persons
and to discriminate among them on the basis of such "socially relevant
characteristics." Meritocratic social ordering celebrates this kind of group-
based discrimination, and sees the "individual" as socially realized through
it.69 Persons talking about individualism and equality of opportunity in this
way often depict the market, at least if constrained by color blindness prin-
ciples, as a race-neutral mechanism of distribution; on this view, market
rationality institutionalizes racial justice."
Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 WI. & MARY L. REV. 33, 46 (1992); cf.
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION UNDER LAW: A
PRELIMINARY REVIEW IN SELECTED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ToPIcs IN EMPLOYMENT AND BUSINESS SET
ASIDES: A CONSULTATION/HEARING OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 181
(1985) ("[I]ndividuals are not merely social means; i.e., they are not merely examples of a group,
representatives of a cohort, or fungible surrogates of other human beings; each, rather is a person whom
it is improper to count or to discount by race." (quoting John E. Morrison, Colorblindness,
Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313,
326 n.93 (1994))).
68. See Lani Guinier, The Real Bias In Higher Education, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1997, at A19
("Had opponents of affirmative action looked beyond race to see why Ms. Hopwood was not admitted,
they would have discovered that she lost points because she went to a community college and a state
university. The University of Texas penalized Ms. Hopwood, who grew up under difficult
circumstances and worked her way through school, because she graduated from a less competitive but
more affordable college."); Siegel, Colorblind Constitutionalism, supra note 20, at 35-36 (noting that
opinion "throws racial discrepancies in admissions ranges into stark relief, while treating as equitably
inconsequential the variance in admissions opportunities produced by the school's policy of favoring
residents and its practice of weighting grades in accordance with the reputation of undergraduate
institutions, despite its predictably class salient impact on admissions").
69. To appreciate how restrictive the use of "individualism" is in meritocratic claims about race,
try substituting anything understood to be a socially relevant trait for the "formal-race" term in the
quotation from Richard Posner that I discuss supra text accompanying note 63. For example, "'[The
use of afn] [educational degree or test score] to establish a presumption that the individual also
possesses other, and socially relevant, characteristics, exemplifies, encourages, and legitimizes the
mode of thought and behavior that underlies most prejudice and bigotry in modem America."'
70. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 6-7. For two variants of this argument, compare
Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312,
1326 (1986) ("As fair shakers see it, removing all barriers to the exercise of civil and political rights
and to an individual's ability to participate in the free market system is the best possible way to
promote justice"), with RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 59-78 (1992) (arguing that eliminating constraints on market
ordering will eliminate invidious race and sex discrimination). For a critical evaluation of such
arguments, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2413-19 (1994)
(evaluating arguments for and against view that free markets eliminate race and sex discrimination).
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C. Color Blindness as a Method of Characterizing Practices:
The Example of Griggs
Bearing in mind the highly specialized ways in which color blindness
discourse reasons about race discrimination, race neutrality, and the traits
of individuals and groups, we can now examine how color blindness dis-
course is employed to characterize particular social practices. We start with
the paradigm case of overt racial segregation. In Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.,7 for example, the defendant originally placed all of its black employ-
ees in one department, called the "labor department," which had the lowest
paying jobs in the company. 72 Title VII, of course, outlawed practices
employing such group-categorical racial distinctions as discriminating on
the basis of race-that is, as irrationally treating applicants for employment
on the basis of group membership rather than evaluating their merits as
individuals. On the effective date of Title VII, the defendant moved to
comply with the statute by eschewing use of group-categorical racial dis-
tinctions, and by requiring instead that all new applicants to formerly white
departments would have to have a high school diploma or certain test
scores.73 Black applicants then challenged these new employment criteria
as violating Title VII.
The district court ruled that by instituting these requirements the
defendant did not discriminate on the basis of race.74 It is easy to see how
this argument runs. The company complied with Title VII by abandoning
group-categorical racial distinctions and adopting instead group-salient
employment criteria. In requiring a high school degree or certain test
scores as a condition of employment in its formerly all-white departments,
the company was asking for qualifications that could well be relevant to
employment, even if such traits were distributed through the population in
a group-salient way. Thus, within a conventional understanding of color
blindness, these new requirements were race-neutral, because they were
not race-categorical even if they were race-salient .7 Further, within a con-
ventional understanding of color blindness, the new requirements treated
applicants for employment as individuals because the requirements did not
distinguish among applicants by racial group, but instead by traits of
potential social relevance, even if these "meritocratic" criteria in turn
71. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
72. See id. at 426-27.
73. See id. at 427-28.
74. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
75. Cf id. at 248. The district court stated that:
In providing for prospective application only, Congress faced the cold hard fact of past
discrimination and the resulting inequities. Congress also realized the practical impossibility
of eradicating all the consequences of past discrimination. The 1964 Act has as its purpose
the abolition of the policies of discrimination which produced the inequities.
[Vol. 88:77
HeinOnline -- 88 Cal. L. Rev. 94 2000
"COLOR BLINDNESS" DISCOURSE
rested on group-based generalizations about the aptitudes and abilities
of the individual applicants who possessed them. As the district court
observed,
The two tests used by the defendant were never intended to
accurately measure the ability of an employee to perform the
particular job available. Rather, they are intended to indicate
whether the employee has the general intelligence and overall
mechanical comprehension of the average high school graduate,
regardless of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.7"
In accordance with the conventions of color blindness discourse, the
defendant company had thus adopted a race-neutral policy even if the pol-
icy continued to exclude most blacks from employment in the higher pay-
ing departments of the company. As this example should illustrate, the
conventions of color blindness discourse make it possible for this society
to characterize practices that enforce racial stratification as the product of
"race-neutral" and "nondiscriminatory" principles of social distribution.
This is one way in which color blindness discourse rationalizes racial
stratification.
Yet in Griggs, the Supreme Court did not accept the lower court's
reasoning about the legality of the policy in question. Instead, the Court
held that, under Title VII, an employer who adopted facially neutral rules
(such as the requirement of test scores or a high school degree) that had a
disparate impact on protected classes might still be found to discriminate
on the basis of race, unless the employer could demonstrate some business
necessity or justification for using the challenged criteria:7 A particular
understanding of race animates the Court's decision: The Griggs opinion
points to the history of racially segregated education in the South to illus-
trate why the use of formally race-neutral criteria might nevertheless be
discriminatory or unfair."8 Given the unequal distribution of educational
opportunity to blacks and whites, employment criteria associated with edu-
cational attainment would predictably select among applicants in a race-
salient way and so reproduce and perpetuate distributive inequities
between blacks and whites. Griggs, in short, recognizes what Gotanda calls
"historical-race," discussing race as a social field of distributive injustice
(in this instance, involving discriminatory or unequal educational opportu-
nity).
Yet at the same time that the Griggs Court begins to discuss race in
this thicker, "historical" sense, as arising out of the unequal distribution of
socially valuable and relevant opportunities (such as education), the
76. Id. at 250.
77. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
78. See id. at 430 ("Because they are Negroes, petitioners have long received inferior education
in segregated schools .... ").
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opinion simultaneously retains and deploys the discourse of individualism
associated with formal-race, as it insists that (1) individuals have merit
and qualifications independent of their racial identity; and (2) distributive
fairness consists in distributing opportunities on the basis of these race-
neutral traits. Mid-course in the opinion, "race" shifts semantic registers,
transformed from a thick bundle of socially relevant traits back to a thin,
socially irrelevant trait, when the Court observes that "Congress has not
commanded that the less qualified be preferred over the better qualified
simply because of minority origins. Far from disparaging job qualifications
as such, Congress has made such qualifications the controlling factor, so
that race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant."'9 Thus, even as
Griggs seemingly recognizes that race is a social formation, it reverts to
the discourse of formal-race to assert that market rationality is race-neutral
and institutionalizes racial justice. These unannounced discursive shifts are
commonplace in the case law and sustain the rhetorical power of color
blindness discourse.'"
Analyzed from this standpoint, color blindness discourse is a highly
specialized mode of characterizing social practices. Consider again the
logic of this semantic code in action. Since implementation of federal
employment discrimination laws, employers rarely organize the workplace
in overtly race-categorical terms. When plaintiffs challenge a seemingly
race-salient practice as covertly race-based, a characterization dispute
ensues along the lines we have just explored. Only if the evidence seems to
support a narrative about the practice as covertly employing group-
categorical racial distinctions (that is, irrational judgments based on "racial
prejudice" that by definition serve no socially relevant end and function
only to differentiate employees on the basis of formal-race) is the practice
judged race-based; if the practice can be explained with respect to any
socially relevant end, trait, or purpose, it will be characterized as race-
neutral, however race-salient in social incidence the practice might be. So,
for example, suppose an employer interviews two black applicants and
eight white applicants, and hires a white employee; has he made an
employment decision on the basis of race? A fact-finder would have to
examine the evidence and characterize the challenged decision as one that
was race-neutral because based on socially relevant criteria
("qualifications," however race-salient in character or distribution they
might be) or as one that was race-based (meaning that the fact-finder was
willing to interpret the evidence as supporting a particular narrative in
which the employer would refuse to hire any black applicant simply
79. Id. at 436.
80. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 50.
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"because" that applicant was black, i.e., for no socially relevant reason
other than prejudice.)"'
81. Here, once again, the law generally assumes that the irrational, class-based animus would be
directed at all class members indiscriminately. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action
Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1030 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[W]here both the person seeking to be promoted and the
person achieving that promotion were women, 'because the person selected was a woman, we cannot
accept sex discrimination as a plausible explanation for [the promotion] decision."' (quoting Adams v.
Reed, 567 F.2d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir. 1978))) (holding that where both applicant promoted and applicant
rejected were black, challenged decision could not have resulted from race discrimination; reaching this
result by following reasoning of sex-discrimination case): cf supra text at notes 33-36 (discussing the
ways law has characterized policies concerning pregnancy and grooming codes). Intermittently,
however, the law does recognize that discrimination could manifest itself in the act of differentiating
among class members. Doctrine, however, typically reaches this result by recognizing subclasses
within the targeted class and treating discrimination directed against members of such subclasses as
actionable. See Walker v. IRS, 713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (dark-skinned African American
employee may bring Title VII action for discrimination based on darkness of skin because Title VII
provides employees protection from discrimination based on "'color" as well as "race"); Jeffries, 615
F.2d at 1032-35 (observing that "sex plus" cases provide support for view that "disparate treatment of a
subclass of women could constitute a violation of Title VII" and recognizing "black females as a
distinct protected subgroup for purposes of the prima facie case and proof of pretext").
The bizarrely abstract conception of discrimination on which such doctrines are based is part of the
formal-race discourse discussed in text. As we have seen, the law generally defines discrimination as
the cognitive error or irrationality that occurs when a decision maker differentiates among persons
based on formal-race; on this view discrimination involves a misascription of traits, either (1) the
assumption that formal-race (or "race per se") has any social relevance or (2) the failure to recognize
that individual members of a group may possess instrumentally relevant traits that most group members
lack.
Sometimes, however, the law seems to acknowledge that discrimination involves more than a
simple breakdown of instrumental rationality, and verges on recognizing discrimination as a problem
concerning status conflicts among groups involving the distribution of a society's material and
dignitary goods. On this account the cognitive error of discrimination involves giving credence to
particular narratives that justify policies and practices which unequally distribute social goods. When
law proceeds from this intuition, doctrine treats discrimination/stereotyping as something more than the
failure to recognize that individual members of a group may have different traits than those generally
possessed by group members. On these occasions, the law treats discrimination/stereotyping as a
normative, narrative process that involves morally suspect prescriptions and cognitively suspect
rationalizations that together justify keeping certain groups in "their proper place." From the standpoint
of this sociohistorical and narratological view of discrimination-which approaches the problem of
race or sex discrimination as one involving the preferential treatment accorded members of some
race/sex groups over others-the law is more adept at recognizing certain reasons for excluding some
(although not all) group members as suspect rationalizations or stereotypes. In short, from this
standpoint, the legal system recognizes as suspect the claim that particular blacks are lazy-or that
particular women are too aggressive.
For a case caught between these two views of discrimination, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989) (reviewing refusal to promote female employee to partner in accounting firm on
grounds that she was too aggressive and had interpersonal difficulties in dealing with staff). In Price
Waterhouse, the plurality opinion first defines discriminatory animus as a distinction on the basis of
formal-sex: "In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that,
if we asked the employer at the moment of decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful
response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman." Id. at 250
(plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). The plurality opinion then immediately proceeds to discuss
discriminatory decision making in terms of the concept of "stereotyping": "[W]e are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group... An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose
positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible Catch-22: out of a job if
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Assuming the fact-finder decided that the employer had made the
hiring decision on race-neutral grounds (i.e., on the basis of qualifications),
plaintiffs would then, of course, have the option of challenging the
"facially-neutral," race-salient practice on disparate impact grounds; if the
defendant employer could then demonstrate business necessity-that is,
characterize the practice as serving some socially relevant, if race-salient,
end-the employer's decision will once again be characterized as race-
neutral within the usages of formal-race discourse as Griggs has elaborated
them.
In a world where no signs identify practices that are "race-based,"
characterization of contested practices will play a crucial role in the opera-
tions of antidiscrimination law. Plainly, in such a world, fact-finders will
have considerable latitude in explaining whether practices "discriminate"
"on the basis of race." But before we even consider the ancillary racial
assumptions that might inform exercise of that interpretive discretion, it is
crucial to consider the limited nature of the claim antidiscrimination law
makes when the law announces that a practice does not discriminate "on
the basis of race."
D. Color Blindness Discourse and Claims of Distributive Justice
When the law announces that a practice does not discriminate on the
basis of race, it speaks within the usages of formal-race discourse. In its
original historical context, this familiar mode of talking about race made
sense in debates over distributive justice in ways it no longer does today.
As we have seen, formal-race discourse tells a particular story about prac-
tices that overtly classify on the basis of race; it deems such practices
instrumentally irrational (because the mere color of a person's skin can
have no social relevance) and distributively unjust (because the belief on
which such practices are predicated-that the mere color of a person's skin
has social relevance-is the product of irrational racial prejudice). The
claim that "race has no social relevance" can be understood, historically
they behave aggressively and out of ajob if they don't. Title VII lifts women out of this bind." Id. at
251. For the Price Waterhouse plurality, does Title VII merely proscribe judgments on the basis of
formal-sex? Or, does the statute proscribe stereotyping, considered as the failure to recognize that the
individual plaintiff might have an instrumentally valuable trait (aggressiveness) that most other
members of her class lack? Or, does the statute instead proscribe a varient of sex-plus, the refusal to
hire an aggressive woman for a job that requires aggressive behavior, so that failure to hire a part of the
class is tantamount to a refusal to hire all of the class, the "intolerable and impermissible Catch-22" to
which the plurality opinion refers? The Price Waterhouse opinion understands that the refusal to
promote an aggressive woman represents a prescriptive judgment that plays an important role in
sustaining sex discrimination, but it is never confident in explaining how or why this is so. This
confusion is evident in the way that the opinion characterizes the case as presenting a problem of
"mixed-motive" discrimination. See id. at 234-36 (identifying as illegitimate ground of decision overtly
sex-based comments about plaintiff's "aggressiveness" and as "legitimate" ground of decision
putatively gender-neutral judgments about deficiencies in plaintiffs "interpersonal skills" in dealing
with staff members).
[Vol. 88:77
HeinOnline -- 88 Cal. L. Rev. 98 2000
"COLOR BLINDNESS" DISCOURSE
and contextually, as repudiating the relevance claims of status-race talk;
and, when understood in this way, the claim that "race has no social rele-
vance" is, of course, rich with meaning. But to observe as much is to rec-
ognize that the meaning of formal-race discourse arises in an act of
negation, as formal-race discourse repudiates the particular set of practices
and justifications associated with status-race discourse. 2 Once antidis-
crimination law prompts the removal of "whites-only" signs from institu-
tions and practices, however, the claims of formal-race discourse begin to
function somewhat strangely as a framework in which to evaluate the dis-
tributive justice of the practices that remain. This problem arises because
of the usages of formal-race discourse itself. Formal-race discourse defines
race in ways that are deeply at odds with the understandings of race that
would seem to be relevant to evaluating the justice of our distributive
practices.
Consider again how color blindness discourse understands the term
"race"-as a group-categorical distinction that has no social relevance. In
debates over the justice of our distributive practices, it might make sym-
bolic or expressive sense to assert that race has no social relevance; but this
claim about race, once disassociated from the historically-specific practices
and rhetorics it originally sought to contest, is not a sensible way of talking
about race if we mean to evaluate the justice, fairness, or distributive neu-
trality of particular practices that are alleged to discriminate on the basis of
"race." To begin thinking about whether a particular practice might be just
or fair with respect to matters of "race," it would seem that we would have
to analyze "race" as it is manifested in a given society at a particular junc-
ture of history: that is, to consider race as a social formation-like ethnic-
ity and gender, arising out of the unequal distribution of socially salient
traits across populations, or more dynamically, as a group-status relation
arising out of the interaction of social structure and social meaning.
Yet as soon as we begin such a discussion, we will depart from the
specialized assumptions about race on which formal-race talk is premised.
Current scientific and social-scientific accounts of race do not treat race as
a group-categorical distinction but instead conceptualize race in terms of
group-salience-as arising out of the uneven incidence of genetic or
82. As we have seen, formal-race talk takes its normative orientation from a particular
sociohistorical project--the disestablishment or alleviation of racial stratification--during a period
when racial stratification was enforced by a particular set of practices (employing group-categorical
distinctions) that were in turn rationalized by a particular set of justifications (asserting the social
relevance of race). Standing alone, formal-race talk quite self-consciously offers no social account of
race apart from the claim that race has no social, political, or moral relevance. But if we reflect on the
semantic structure of this claim, we can see that its (highly specialized) social meaning arises in the
negation of another set of claims about race. Differently put, the claim that race has no social, political,
or moral relevance derives all of its social, political, and moral valence in the repudiation of the
particular social, political, and moral account of race offered by status-race discourse (i.e., claims of
"prejudice," "racism," or "White Supremacy").
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phenotypic or social traits in a population; 3 this is the approach to race
reflected in historical-race and culture-race discourses. Further, historical-
race and culture-race discourses understand race as aggregations of
socially relevant traits-that is, they conceptualize race as made of norms,
understandings, cognitive and practical skills, material resources, life expe-
riences, practices, activities, memories, concerns, commitments, fears,
interests, desires, and identifications that are distributed in a society in
group-salient patterns that persist with variable intensity over time. Some
version of this approach to conceptualizing race as a social formation
seems inevitable in debates over the justice of our distributive practices,
however complexly we model the problem in institutional, dynamic, eco-
nomic, or other terms. For if we want to identify particular social practices
that are distributively just with respect to race, it would indeed seem that,
whatever our view of distributive fairness, we would have to reason about
race as it is socially instantiated, whether in historical or cultural terms.
By contrast, when antidiscrimination law reasons in terms of formal-
race, the law defines discrimination with respect to a very specialized
notion of race-race understood as a subgroup of the population marked
by no traits of any social relevance. Once race is defined this way, any
practice that can be characterized as rationally selecting for a socially rele-
vant trait can be characterized as neutral with respect to race: that is, as
83. The Supreme Court intermittently analyzes race in this way, as do an increasing number of
scholars. See, e.g., Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609 n.4 (1987) (discussing
biological and anthropological studies supporting view that "racial classifications are for the most part
sociopolitical, rather than biological in nature"; noting that literature contends that "genetically
homogeneous populations do not exist and traits are not discontinuous between populations; therefore,
a population can only be described in terms of relative frequencies of various traits [and] [c]lear-cut
categories do not exist"); Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument. Du Bois and the Illusion of
Race, in "RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 21, 30-32 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1985) (discussing
genetic studies demonstrating "extent to which members of... human populations we call races differ
more from each other than they do from members of the same race"); Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social
Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 1, 10-16 (1994) (same); id. at 7 (describing race as "a vast group of people loosely bound
together by historically contingent, socially significant elements of their morphology and/or
ancestry .... a sui generis social phenomenon in which contested systems of meaning serve as the
connections between physical features, races, and personal characteristics").
Genetic and cultural accounts of race can be expressed in homologous terms, as arising out of the
distribution of traits in a population. On this view, cultures are populations marked by distributions of
relatively similar norms and understandings. Cf. BALKCIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE, supra note 56, at 49-
50, 53, 90-97 (observing that cultures and subcultures are distributions of relatively similar shared
understandings and habits). These traits, norms, and understandings are, of course, embedded in social
relations and social structures that play an important part in making them meaningful. Contemporary
theorists emphasize the dynamic interplay of social structure and social meaning in constructing race.
See also Haney Lopez, supra at 7 (asserting that race "is neither an essence nor an illusion, but rather
an ongoing, contradictory, self-reinforcing process subject to the macro forces of social and political
struggle and the micro effects of daily decisions"). See generally Ora & WINANT, supra note 32
(rejecting the view that race has a biological foundation and the view that it is merely a social "illusion"
or cognitive error; adopting "racial formation" approach that understands race as growing out of
interaction of "both social structure and cultural representation").
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differienting on the basis of some trait other than race itself. But, of
course, the "race" with respect to which the practice is said to be neutral is
something of a legal fiction, in the sense that this usage of the term "race"
arises out of special mode of talking about race (formal-race) that insists
that race is a group-categorical distinction that has no social relevance.
Our analysis of Griggs demonstrated just how limited color blindness
talk is as a framework for reasoning about the justice of distributive prac-
tices in matters of race. In Griggs, as we saw, the Court relinquished the
premises of formal-race discourse in order to reason about race as it is
socially embodied in history. From this sociohistorical standpoint, the
Court recognized that race is a site of unequal distribution of socially valu-
able (i.e., relevant) educational resources. Once the Court began to reason
about race and education this way, it tacitly acknowledged that making
judgments about the socially relevant traits of "individuals" involves
making judgments within, not without, the social field of race.' Yet, pre-
cisely as Griggs verged on recognizing this fact, the opinion repressed the
recognition by urgently reinvoking the premises of formal-race discourse
and asserting that hiring criteria which select for traits that are relevant to
the achievement of business purposes are distributively neutral with
respect to race 5
Thus, as our analysis of Griggs demonstrates, the vice (or virtue) of
color blindness discourse is that it conceals the distributive consequences
of group-salient practices in a semantic code that defines instrumentally
rational utterances as race-neutral. As antidiscrimination law tells the story,
we never even have to face the question of reconciling conflicts between
equality and efficiency goals, because formal-race discourse draws upon
concepts of instrumental rationality as a framework in which to define dis-
tributive justice in matters of race. Since Tussman and tenBroek began rea-
soning about race discrimination as a breach of instrumental rationality 6 -
an approach that was in turn embedded in the foundations of strict scrutiny
doctrinel---the law has defined practices that can be characterized as
selecting for traits that are instrumentally related to the achievement of
legitimate social ends as practices that do not discriminate on the basis of
race. In so doing, antidiscrimination law has defined distributive fairness in
matters of race in terms of a specialized concept of race-formal-race-
84. This would seem to follow, so long as we can identify no relevant distinction between the
traits that are said to constitute individuals (as they appear in the particular bundles we call persons)
and the traits that are said to constitute groups (as they appear in the particular distributions that give
groups their distinguishable social "identities").
85. As Griggs triumphantly concludes, "Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be
preferred over the better qualified simply because of minority origins. Far from disparaging job
qualifications as such, Congress has made such qualifications the controlling factor, so that race,
religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,436 (1971).
86. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
87. See id. (discussing legal-process approaches to antidiscrimination law).
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that, by definition, has no connection to those social features of race
(whether historical or cultural) that might bear on the justice of our dis-
tributive practices. "
Yet the system of characterization employed by antidiscrimination
law has been used by courts to designate a wide variety of race-salient
practices as race-based, even when such practices are not identified by a
sign reading "whites only." It has also been employed by courts to charac-
terize a wide-variety of race-salient practices as race-neutral, even when
such practices are justified in the semantic code that has grown up in our
civil rights culture to enable whites who understand themselves to be race-
egalitarians to continue arguing about race relations without speaking in
race-categorical terms. 9 What exactly is driving these results?
Once "whites-only" signs are removed, the power of color blindness
discourse to disrupt or to rationalize social stratification at any given
moment in history seems to depend, not on some Archimedean point of
race-neutrality that the discourse of color blindness identifies, but rather on
independent views about the nature of race held by those who wield the
discourse. Differently put, those who embrace color blindness norms also
hold beliefs about the nature of race as a social formation, and, in various
doctrinal contexts, those concurrent convictions about the social nature of
race play an important role in determining whether, and to what extent,
claims about color blindness tend to undermine or legitimate social stratifi-
cation.
If one assumes that, absent discrimination, members of different racial
groups are relatively similar in their interests and abilities, then one would
expect to find a relatively similar distribution of different groups through-
out various fields of social endeavor; if, on the contrary, one assumes that
there are significant and lasting differences amongst such groups, then one
would expect to find an unequal distribution of the groups throughout the
society. During the first decades of the Second Reconstruction, it was often
assumed that differences in the social distribution of racial groups were
88. When discrimination and neutrality are defined with respect to formal race, this highly
abstract account of race will efface structural inequality in baselines and norms that shape meritocratic
competition. Formal-race discourse does not register (1) inequality in the resources with which
members of different groups can compete or (2) the group-salience of traits deemed relevant to
success in any given social undertaking, a form of bias often attributable to the group-affiliation of
those who originally defined how a task was to be performed, or to status-marking of the traits
themselves (i.e., leadership requires "aggression" rather than "sensitivity," "initiative" rather than
"responsiveness").
89. Cf. Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 20, at 1135-48 (demonstrating how prevailing
definitions of discriminatory purpose insulate practices that are highly race- and gender-salient from
legal challenge, with special attention to questions of crack cocaine and domestic violence); see also
supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing how linguistically competent social actors are
aware of the differences between group-categorical and group-salient distinctions and can manipulate
them when discussing matters implicating race and gender relations).
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largely attributable to the effects of present or past discrimination 0 Since
the 1970s, however, a growing body of scholars has drawn upon ethnicity
theory to attempt to explain social stratification as a product of group
cultural dynamics rather than "discrimination." As Nathan Glazer and
Daniel Moynihan explained in their introduction to a book on ethnicity
in 1975: "[E]thnic groups bring different norms to bear on common
circumstances with consequent different levels of success-hence group
differences in status."'" This social-scientific examination of the traits that
might account for the success and status of ethnic (i.e., "outsider") groups
offered a new way of talking about the relation of group difference and
group stratification-one that self-consciously distinguished itself from the
traditions of status-race talk and explained differences in the social position
of groups as arising out of group-salient distributions of traits in a popula-
tion; consequently, this approach allowed for discussion of group differ-
ence and group status on terms that could be reconciled with the central
tenets of formal-race talk. Indeed, the race-as-ethnicity story did more than
offer a way of talking about group difference and group status that was
consistent with the central tenets of color blindness discourse; it coupled
the story about individualism told by formal-race talk with culturally
potent narratives about the immigrant's struggle from rags-to-riches that
played an important role in redefining the sociopolitical salience of color
blindness discourse in politics and law.
Since the 1970s, assumptions about race-as-ethnicity have increas-
ingly structured arguments about the moral grounds for and proper appli-
cation of antidiscrimination law in popular, academic, and ultimately, legal
foraY' Consistent with their origins in a theory of social stratification, these
90. For an illustration of how the interpretive presumptions of antidiscrimination law used
concepts of discrimination to explain disparities in racial representation, see, for example, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In the case the Court stated that
statistics can be an important source of proof in employment discrimination cases, since
absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will
in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition
of the population in the community from which employees are hired. Evidence of long
lasting and gross disparity between the composition of a work force and that of the general
population thus may be signficant even though... Title VII imposes no requirement that a
work force mirror the general population.
Id. at 340 n.20; see also Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1750, 1771-75 (1990) (discussing race discrimination cases decided
between 1967-71 that explained the dearth of minority applicants for particular jobs in terms of a
"futility" doctrine which interpreted the employment preferences of minority applicants in light of the
exogenous-and racially discriminatory-norms and practices that might have shaped them).
91. Nathan Glazer & Daniel P. Moynihan, Introduction, i n ETHNICITY: THEORY AND
EXPERIENCE 17 (Nathan Glazer & Daniel P. Moynihan eds., 1975), quoted in OmI & WINANT, supra
note 32, at 31.
92. It would be a much longer story to trace how this mode of reasoning about race infiltrates and
begins to reshape antidiscrimination law during the 1970s and 1980s, affecting interpretive
presumptions concerning the ways one proves an individual disparate treatment claim and a pattern or
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race-as-ethnicity arguments most frequently view race as manifesting itself
in socially relevant, group-salient differences-a narrative frequently
invoked to explain persisting social stratification in a society committed to
meritocratic, individualist, and color-blind principles of distribution.93
practice claim, see, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), as well as the
disparate impact claim, see Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988); Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). and the debate over racial quotas that culminated in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.
The race-as-ethnicity story also played a rich and complicated role in the retrenchment of
affirmative action law, starting with Justice Powell's compromise reformulation of educational
affirmative action as serving "diversity" rather than remedial ends in Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See
Siegel, Colorblind Constitutionalism, supra note 20, at 40-41. "Diversity" supplied a socially
compelling rhetoric for educational affirmative action precisely because the race-as-culture concept
appealed to those who wanted to affirm racial identity as something other than the accretion of
historical injustice-as well as those, such as Justice Powell, who wanted to resist demands for racial
redistribution justified by historical-race discourse, or to dilute the authority of such collective-memory
narratives by surrounding them with competing historical narratives of difference and disadvantage.
See id.; see also Siegel, Collective Memory, supra note 20, at 136-37 (noting that Justice Powell's
claim that "we are a Nation of minorities" repudiates collective responsibility for racial stratification
"by deconstructing the category of white persons understood as decendants of slave-owners"). Soon
thereafter, the race-as-ethnicity narrative began to play an important role in affirmative action law
outside the educational context, when the Court invoked culture-race discourse as a reason for
intensifying the evidentiary showing that state actors would have to make in order to demonstrate they
were entitled to adopt an affirmative action program for purposes of remedying past discrimination. See
Siegel, Colorblind Constitutionalism, supra note 20, at 43-46 (discussing cases such as City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).
Finally, it bears noting that during the 1980s, these same currents were working themselves out in
matters of sex discrimination law as well, most prominently in the debate provoked by the Sears case
and "choice" or difference-based justifications for gender disparities in the work force. See EEOC v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). See generally Schultz, supra note 92 (discussing
lack-of-interest arguments in sex discrimination cases).
93. See, e.g., NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND
PUBLIC POLICY 62-63 (1975) (arguing that antidiscrimination law erroneously assumes that, absent
discrimination, there would be random distribution of women and minorities in all jobs, when the
distribution of jobs among minority groups is best explained by differences in educational
qualifications, regional variables, and difficult to quantify factors "such as taste or, if you will,
culture"); Abram, supra note 70, at 1315-16 ("Because groups-black, white, Hispanic, male, and
female-do not necessarily have the same distribution of, among other characteristics, skills, interest,
motivation, and age, a fair shake system may not produce proportional representation across
occupations and professions, and certainly not at any given time. This uneven distribution, however, is
not necessarily the result of discrimination. Thomas Sowell has shown through comparative studies of
ethnic group performance that discrimination alone cannot explain these ethnic groups' varying levels
of achievement.").
In a recent attack on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Charles Murray offered an instance of this
equality-of-opportunity/equality-of-results argument that is particularly transparent in its assumptions
about the "real" nature of race and gender differences:
At any moment in history a completely fair system for treating individuals will produce
different outcomes for different groups, because groups are hardly ever equally represented
in the qualities that go into decisions about whom to hire, admit to law school, put in jail, or
live next door to .... [A] system that... judg[ed] each case perfectly on its merits [] would
produce drastically different proportions of men and women hired by police forces, blacks
and whites put in jail, or Jews and gentiles admitted to elite law schools.
CHARLES MURRAY, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A LIBERTARIAN: A PERSONAL INTERPRETATION 85-86
(1997).
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Infused with this specially coded narrative about race-as-ethnicity-a nar-
rative that would seem to be interested in cultural accounts of race only
insofar as the "culture "-concept provides an explanation, and justifica-
tion, for social stratification-antidiscrimination law can become a power-
ful tool for rationalizing social inequality. For once formal-race talk is
coupled with this highly specialized form of culture-race talk, the particu-
lar version of color blindness discourse that results will begin to interpret
existing distributions as evidence of the outcomes that result when
"individuals" and the groups to which they belong are given "equality of
opportunity." Discrepancies in the rates at which different groups partici-
pate in various fields of social endeavor no longer seem to be the product
of present or past discrimination;' instead discrepancies in the rates at
which different groups participate in various fields of social endeavor will
appear as evidence of the differing distribution of group-salient traits that
mark and define racial (or ethnic or gender) groups as culturally distinct
groups. From this same standpoint, any attempt to vary the rate at which
different groups participate in various fields of social endeavor will appear
as a breach of distributive neutrality and an inefficient and unjust form of
"social engineering. '
Yet, as should be plain by now, the only way that such accounts can
demonstrate that existing discrepancies in group participation result from
the workings of equality of opportunity (rather than discrimination) is by
asserting beliefs about race-as-ethnicity-that is, by describing race as
manifested in the unequal distribution of socially relevant traits throughout
the population.96 As Charles Murray succinctly puts it:
At any given moment in history a completely fair system for
treating individuals will produce different outcomes for different
groups, because groups are hardly ever equally represented in the
The Supreme Court would seem to have adopted some (presumably more temperate) version of
this social hypothesis to discredit the presumption that the discrepant representation of minority groups
is likely attributable to discrimination, and disparages assumptions about "proportional representation"
in order to justify, inter alia, constitutional restrictions on affirmative action. See Siegel, Colorblind
Constitutionalism, supra note 20, at 57-61 (analyzing racial commitments of color-blind
constitutionalism). See generally id. at 54 ("A story about competition among groups with different
genetic and cultural endowments explains, and justifies, relations of racial status; a story about
maintaining appropriate distinctions between public and private spheres explains, and justifies, legal
rules that preserve relations of racial status.").
94. Cf supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing presumptions of race discrimination
jurisprudence during the 1960s and 1970s).
95. See supra note 93 (discussing interpretive presumptions of culture-race discourse as
elaborated during the last several decades).
96. This observation addresses the debate as it unfolds in the political arena, where too often
"discrimination" and "culture" are treated as distinct and opposing, rather than interlocking and
mutually constitutive, social processes that might cause discrepancies in the rates at which members of
different groups participate in various fields of social endeavor.
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qualities that go into decisions about whom to hire, admit to law
school, put in jail, or live next door to .... 11
In short, the claim that race neutrality is served by embracing principles
that secure "equality of opportunity" rather than "equality of result" turns
out to rest on independent social assumptions about the nature of race that
flatly contradict the premises of color blindness discourse itself. Such
arguments nicely demonstrate my earlier point that formal-race discourse,
standing alone, does not supply a basis in which we can cogently debate
the justice of our distributive practices; to enter such a debate, one has to
make certain claims about the nature of race as a social formation-that is,
to begin to talk about race as it is manifested in a particular society at a
particular juncture of history. This color blindness discourse cannot do,
unless those employing formal-race talk overtly or covertly couple this
mode of reasoning about race with modes of reasoning about race that are
rooted in historical-race or cultural-race discourse.
To summarize the argument as I have developed it thus far, color
blindness discourse in antidiscrimination law is a mode of characterizing
social practices that specifies whether such practices distribute access to
social goods in legitimate ways; it works both to discredit and to rational-
ize practices that maintain social stratification. Because color blindness
discourse defines "discrimination on the basis of race" in highly special-
ized ways-as a practice of group-categorical differentiation that serves no
instrumentally relevant end---color blindness discourse can both discredit
and rationalize practices that perpetuate racial stratification.
Formal-race discourse originated in the effort to explain why practices
that overtly segregated on the basis of race were instrumentally irrational
and distributively unjust. Once antidiscrimination law used formal-race
discourse to eliminate practices that overtly classified on the basis of race,
the rhetoric of formal-race discourse took on a new life. Because formal-
race discourse defines race as a group-categorical distinction having no
social relevance, formal-race discourse can now be used to characterize as
race-neutral any race-salient practice that can be described as instrumen-
tally related to the achievement of a legitimate social end. But such prac-
tices are only neutral with respect to a highly restrictive definition of
race-race understood as a form of group categorical distinction that has
no social relevance. This highly formalized mode of characterizing prac-
tices conflates claims about the instrumental rationality of practices with
claims about the distributive justice of practices; claims about the distribu-
tive justice of practices generated within this formal-race framework are
unpersuasive precisely because race has been defined as a trait that has no
social relevance-an understanding of race that would seem entirely
97. MURRAY, supra note 93, at 85.
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unsuited to deciding whether practices are distributively just with respect
to race. As we examine the application of antidiscrimination law and the
political debates it has engendered, it would appear that the power of color
blindness discourse to disrupt or to rationalize social stratification does not
flow from the ability of formal-race discourse to identify some ground of
distributive neutrality in social practices but instead reflects assumptions
about the nature of race as a social, historical, or cultural formation that are
independent of-and in conflict with-the formal premises of color blind-
ness discourse itself.
"PRESERVATION-THROUGH-TRANSFORMATION": ANTIDISCRIMINATION
AND ANTISUBORDINATION PRINCIPLES IN SOCIOHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
To this point I have tried to show how the concept of stratification
missing from Post's sociological account of the field enables us to make
more sense of the trope of blindness at the heart of antidiscrimination law.
In the preceding Part of my Response, I showed how color blindness dis-
course relates social structure and social meaning in such a way as to dis-
rupt racial stratification and to rationalize it. In concluding my Response, I
now want to give this argument temporal extension, to consider its impli-
cations given the ways that practices and meanings which sustain group
inequality evolve as they are contested over time. I believe that a socio-
logical approach that is attentive to stratification and the mutability of
status-enforcing practices can teach us much about the changing sociopoli-
tical salience of color blindness discourse over the course of the Second
Reconstruction, and in so doing, shed new light on the debate between
antidiscrimination and antisubordination norms that currently divides aca-
demic and popular opinion about matters of race and sex equality.
As I take up these questions, I will be reflecting once again on what it
means to do antidiscrimination law from a sociological standpoint, and so
returning to the main challenge of Post's Lecture. First, and perhaps most
significantly, I will argue that a sociological approach attentive to stratifi-
cation and to the mutability of status-enforcing practices can in fact tell us
more about the underlying purposes of antidiscrimination law than Post's
Lecture suggests. When we consider how tropes of blindness have been
deployed from a sociohistoric vantage point, we can see that a commitment
to alleviating stratification is and has been central to the project of antidis-
crimination law since the beginning of the Second Reconstruction. But, I
argue, the very method of analysis that demonstrates the centrality of this
normative commitment to the antidiscrimination project simultaneously
reveals the limitations of meta-principles (such as "antidiscrimination" or
"antisubordination") in guiding our critical practices. Thus, in the final
analysis, I concur with Post that a sociological approach to the field
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constructively reframes many important normative questions, yet does so
without rendering them amenable to resolution by application of general
principles alone. I reject the legal-formalist assumption that abstract
("principled") reasoning alone can adduce the kinds of social groups
towards which discrimination is directed or the kinds of social forms it
assumes. However much such understandings may be informed by princi-
ple, they are forged in history, through social struggle, as various features
of social stratification are contested over time.
To resume consideration of some of the larger methodological ques-
tions raised by Post's Lecture, I would like to begin this last Part of my
Response as I intend to end it: by pausing to consider reflexively where
we stand as we comment on the nature of antidiscrimination law. In his
Lecture, Post characterizes the alternative perspective he offers on antidis-
crimination law as "sociological;" at various points I have characterized
my own style of analysis as "sociohistorical." Each of us is nevertheless
doing "law"--endeavoring to step outside doctrinal frameworks of analysis
to make observations about the operations of law that we understand as
deeply pertinent to the development of the law, and ultimately, to the for-
mulation of doctrine itself. Indeed, it seems to me that this effort to break
out of legal categories and apprehend the "real" and "actual" operations of
law in society is a characteristic feature of legal reason, one familiar way in
which members of a legal order contest its governing rules and norms. In
such struggles, doctrine typically is denounced as overly, if not perni-
ciously, formalistic, and legal decision makers are urged to take actual
social practices and understandings into account in reshaping the law. This
impulse may assume the form of a self-conscious jurisprudential move-
ment, such as Legal Realism, or a call for interdisciplinarity within law,
such as Sociological Jurisprudence or Law and Economics. Or, this
impulse may manifest itself interstitially, as an appeal to common social
understanding that appears in the course of ordinary legal argument. For
example, many of the most famous rhetorical assaults on Jim Crow are
appeals for legal doctrine to take account of what "[e]veryone knows"
about the "real meaning" of segregation.98 Indeed, as we consider the
rhetorical form of such interpretive conflicts, we can see eerie parallels
between Justice Harlan's passionate challenge to legal formalism and
98. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); cf. Charles L. Black,
Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960) (responding to the
claim that segregation treats the races "'equally' with the suggestion that "we ought to exercise one of
the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers-that of laughter"). In Brown, the Court avoided this kind
of appeal to common social understanding by invoking social-scientific evidence about the harms of
segregation in the opinion's predictably criticized "footnote I ." See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 494 n.1 (1954).
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indignant protests about the meaning the Court has given "equal
protection" today.99
Since the delegitimation of Jim Crow, appeals for antidiscrimination
law to take into account social structure and social meaning typically
occur within two areas of doctrine: in debates about the legality of
"group-conscious" remedies that differentiate among individuals on the
basis of group membership, and in debates about the legality of "facially
neutral" practices that differentially burden groups without formally differ-
entiating among their members. Doctrinal debate occurred in these areas
because, as my analysis of Griggs shows, by the 1970s civil rights law had
precipitated a shift in the rule structure and justificatory rhetoric of the
practices that enforced the differential social status of racial groups."' With
the enforcement of civil rights law during the 1950s and 1960s, those
whites interested in preserving racial stratification began to abandon the
use of overt group-categorical distinctions, more or less at the same time as
those interested in using civil rights law to alleviate racial stratification
began to employ practices incorporating group-categorical racial distinc-
tions.'"' Under these circumstances, the doctrinal injunction against dis-
crimination-with its account of blindness understood as a prohibition on
group-categorical race and sex distinctions-seemed to point equality law
in directions at odds with the intuitions of many civil rights advocates
interested in ameliorating the persisting inequality of traditionally disem-
powered groups.
In 1976, Owen Fiss engaged these debates about the legality of
"benign" racial distinctions and facially neutral practices in an influential
article that appeared in Philosophy & Public Affairs entitled Groups and
the Equal Protection Clause."e He opened his argument with an appeal for
law to free itself from the constraints of antidiscrimination doctrine and
renew itself by once again examining the social relationships it was
endeavoring to shape. As Fiss defined his project:
99. Consider Justice Harlan's demand in Plessy for the Court to take account of what "[e]veryone
knows" about the "real meaning" of segregation, 163 U.S. at 557, and the challenge to legal formalism
that drives Justice Stevens' dissent in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), in which
Justice Stevens argued,
The Court's explanation for treating dissimilar race-based decisions as though they were
equally objectionable is a supposed inability to differentiate between 'invidious' and 'benign'
discrimination.... But the term 'affirmative action' is common and well understood. Its
presence in everyday parlance shows that people understand the difference between good
intentions and bad.
Id. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. ("The consistency that the Court espouses would
disregard the difference between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat.... An interest in
'consistency' does not justify treating differences as though they were similarities.").
100. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 25-27 (discussing the preservation-through-
transformation dynamic).
101. See Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 20, at 1141-44.
102. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976).
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I want to suggest that the antidiscrimination principle embodies a
very limited conception of equality... [and] to outline another
mediating principle-the group-disadvantaging principle-one that
has as good, if not better, claim to represent the ideal of equality,
one that takes a fuller account of social reality, and one that more
clearly focuses the issues that must be decided in equal protection
cases.1o3
The "group-disadvantaging principle" that Fiss proposed in 1976 is
often referred to as an "antisubordination principle," an "antisubjugation
principle," or an "anticaste principle," and especially as elaborated by
Catharine MacKinnon," Derrick Bell, Laurence Tribe, Charles Lawrence,
Randall Kennedy, Ruth Colker, Cass Sunstein, Kenneth Karst, and many
others, has played a central role in the equality literature, 5 particularly in
debates over affirmative action and doctrines concerning discriminatory
purpose and disparate impact.t 6
I was fortunate to study equality law with Owen Fiss, as did Robert
Post before me, and my approach to equality law has, from the outset, been
profoundly shaped by the antisubordination literature: by the quest to
understand antidiscrimination law in light of social structure and social
struggle, as involving problems in group inequality. Yet I was never drawn
to the project of philosophically elaborating an antisubordination principle
as such. Perhaps because of our common training in American literature
and history, I share with Robert Post a skepticism that law can be fruitfully
articulated in principles that can be abstracted from the concrete social
practices law aspires to shape. 7 It is for this reason that I have attempted
to analyze questions of gender and race inequality in a "thick"
103. Id. at 108.
104. MacKinnon was the first to give an extended, particularized, and critically provocative
explication of the antisubordination approach in her influential analysis of sexual harassment. See
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979) [hereinafter
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT]; her subsequent elaboration of the theoretical framework of this
path-breaking work has been equally influential in the antidiscrimination literature. See Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32 (1987).
105. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-21, at 1514-21 (2d
ed. 1988); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex. Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1003 (1986): Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and
Distrust A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1986); Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987); Sunstein, supra note 70, at 2410.
106. See, e.g., Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 20, at 369 n.426 (citing commentators
who have employed antisubordination values "to distinguish between benign and invidious race- and
sex-based state action, as well as to criticize doctrines requiring a showing of discriminatory purpose to
challenge facially neutral state action").
107. For one account of Post's views on these matters, see Robert Post, Recuperating First
Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1272-73 (1995) (arguing that "law... does not deal
with values as merely abstract ideas or principles;" instead, "all legal values are rooted in the
experiences associated with local and specific kinds of social practices").
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sociohistorical framework, examining the institutions, practices, stories,
and meanings through which group stratification has been maintained, with
special attention to the ways in which such institutions, practices, stories,
and meanings have evolved through periods of social conflict. Indeed, one
reason that I have engaged in this project of thick description is to show
how the antisubordination principle can be understood as an appropriate
expression of antidiscrimination commitments in sociohistorical, rather
than philosophical, terms." 8
My work illustrates how struggles over group inequality can
transform the rules and reasons by which social stratification is enforced
and justified. This dynamic, which I call "preservation through
transformation,""'' suggests why the debate between antidiscrimination and
antisubordination principles transpired during the 1970s. As civil rights
advocates challenged the conventional practices and rationales supporting
race and gender inequality, they precipitated a shift in the rule structure
and justificatory rhetoric of these status regimes. In time, an antidiscrimi-
nation principle that had been elaborated with respect to the status-
enforcing practices and rationales of the early twentieth century became ill-
suited for challenging the kinds of status-enforcing practices and rationales
that emerged in their wake."0 It is in this context that we can understand
Fiss's call in 1976 for a new "mediating" principle through which to inter-
pret the Equal Protection Clause.
Considered from this sociohistorical vantage point, we can under-
stand Fiss as expressing the normative commitments of the "Second
Reconstruction" in rhetorical terms that might enable continued critical
engagement with the world the civil rights movement brought into being.
That world was one in which-thanks to color blindness discourse-many
of the traditional practices and rationales supporting race and gender ine-
quality were discredited; yet it was also a world in which-again, thanks to
color blindness discourse-stratification by race and gender persisted
across social sectors, often enforced in new ways and rationalized in new
rhetorical terms. As Griggs illustrates, in this world, social stratification
was commonly sustained through "facially neutral" practices, rather than
group-based classifications, while group-based classifications were more
commonly employed to alleviate social stratification than to entrench it."'
Fiss's "group-disadvantaging principle" thus began the work of translating
108. See generally Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 20 (analyzing contemporary equal
protection doctrines in long-term historical perspective); cf. Siegel, Colorblind Constitutionalism,
supra note 20, at 57-61.
109. Siegel, Rule of Love, supra note 20, at 2175-88 (describing dynamic of preservation-through-
transformation).
110. Cf. id. at 2188-96 (discussing gender cases); Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 20, at
1141-48 (discussing race cases).
Ill. See id.
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the status-disestablishing commitments of the Second Reconstruction into
rhetorical terms better adapted to challenging the status-enforcing practices
of the civil rights era. In this universe, the discourse of antisubordination
identified and critically illuminated the social practices supporting race and
gender stratification in ways that, Griggs notwithstanding, the discourse of
antidiscrimination and color blindness no longer could."2
On this account, then, Fiss and those who followed him sought a
new language in which to describe the assault on racial stratification
already initiated during the Second Reconstruction in the language of
color blindness itself. If I am correct in this account, then it would appear
that sociohistorical analysis enables us to say considerably more about the
purposes of equality law than Post has. Throughout his Lecture, Post sug-
gests that a sociological understanding of antidiscrimination law would
have us reshape race and gender conventions so as to promote the purposes
of the law. But he never gives any hint as to what those purposes might be.
By contrast, on my account, the purpose of antidiscrimination law is and
has been to ameliorate certain forms of racial group stratification. At the
height of the civil rights movement, the discourse of antidiscrimination and
color blindness constrained certain practices used to enforce racial segre-
gation and to this extent served to alleviate group inequality. In other
words, at the beginning of the Second Reconstruction, the discourse of
"antidiscrimination" promoted what we might now understand as
"antisubordination" ends. Clarifying this much about the moving commit-
ments of the Second Reconstruction seems to me of absolutely crucial con-
sequence, given the very different racial views and commitments of those
who now claim Martin Luther King's legacy." 3
Of course, in King's era, application of antidiscrimination principles
only partly disestablished group stratification; nor is it clear that many of
the white Americans who applied such principles ever aspired to more."
No doubt in this social struggle, as in so many others, Americans differed
112. Cf. Siegel, Colorblind Constitutionalism, supra note 20, at 56 (arguing that the sociopolitical
salience of color blindness discourse varies with the historical context in which it is invoked). Color
blindness discourse was rhetorically designed to delegitimate the group-categorical classifications of
status-race discourse as status-race discourse stood at the beginning of the Second Reconstruction. As I
have demonstrated, see supra text accompanying notes 65-69, it protected persons from no other form
of group-based categorization, as it entitled persons to be treated as "individuals" with respect to their
formal-race only. So, given particular social practices to which it was responsive, color blindness
discourse ameliorated racial group stratification; that is, it worked to alleviate the subordination of
African Americans as a group.
113. For illustrations of the ways that opponents of affirmative action invoke the mantle of the
civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, see Seigel, Rule of Love, supra note 20, at 2185 n.244.
For an analysis of the social vision and normative understandings informing equality rhetoric in debates
over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see Drew Hansen, Civil Rights and the Making of the American
Ideal, 1954-1964 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
114. See, e.g., Siegel, Colorblind Constitutionalism, supra note 20, at 57-61; Siegel, Equal
Protection, supra note 20, at 1142-43.
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in their understanding of the kind of changes it would take to realize the
ideal of equality in social practice, and just as importantly, they differed in
the degree to which they imagined that a world of race and gender equality
would nonetheless remain race- and gender-stratified. "1 5
Indeed, if we consider the question at this level of specificity, I agree
with Post that a sociological approach still requires close and context-based
analysis of the purposes of antidiscrimination law before it can be trans-
lated into legal doctrine. To see why, let us turn from the problems of
positive to normative analysis, that is, from historical reconstruction to pre-
sent prescription. Suppose we embrace an antisubordination priniciple. On
what grounds do we decide which practices inflict dignitary harm? Any
expression of sexuality in the workplace? If not, which expressions of
sexuality, and why? How much differentiation on the basis of race or gen-
der should survive in a race- and gender-equal world? And in which social
contexts? In the family setting? In matters of erotic attraction? In the world
of work? Politics? War? Even if we say that antidiscrimination law has as
its purpose the disestablishment of entrenched forms of group inequality,
or the amelioration of social stratification, or the general end of eliminating
the unjust subordination of traditionally disempowered groups, there obvi-
ously remains ample ground for disagreement in a variety of social con-
texts about the particular ends we are seeking, the best means of achieving
them, and finally, the kinds of group life that amelioration of social stratifi-
cation will support. In short, the very method of analysis that demonstrates
the centrality of antistratification concerns to the antidiscrimination project
simultaneously reveals the limitations of "meta-principles," such as
"antidiscrimination" or "antisubordination," in guiding our critical prac-
tices.
Once we understand equality and discrimination as problems in group
stratification produced and rationalized by an ever-changing array of social
practices and meanings, the question of our ends becomes far more com-
plicated to articulate. As I have explored with respect to nineteenth-century
conflicts over women's rights, attempts to imagine status-equality inevita-
bly draw upon the status values of the very social order they aspire to dis-
establish."6 But the practices and meanings constituting the contested
115. This is exactly the problem we confront if we want to give any more precise and positive
account of the heterogeneous commitments of civil rights advocates during the 1950s and 1960s. This
was an era in which advocates spoke a language of blindness and individualism that worked to alleviate
racial group stratification but that may have obscured, possibly from the advocates themselves,
divergent visions of the kind of social world that tropes of color blindness might bring into being.
116. See Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 20, at 1131-35 (exploring how the joint property claim
advanced by the nineteenth-century woman's rights movement transvalued gender conventions,
drawing upon aspects of separate spheres discourse even as it was contesting it); id. at 1198-1205
(demonstrating how the movement's new conception of economic equality-avoiding domestic labor
in favor of wage work outside the home-internalized status norms about work rooted in relations of
gender, race, and class inequality).
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status order are always in flux, and so inevitably will be emancipatory
efforts to imagine and express status-equality. Hence, during the 1970s we
witnessed a revolt against color blindness talk as an "assimilationist" rheto-
ric that tacitly encoded white privilege, and a corresponding effort to
embrace "diversity" talk and to affirm the dignity of subordinated groups
by contesting directly the traditional status-valuation of their social and
cultural traits. Race-that is, membership in a subordinated racial group-
was no longer something that had to be politely overlooked, but instead
emerged as a social fact about which members of subordinated groups
could express pride. Second-wave feminism began in this blindness tradi-
tion as well, with equality initially expressed in terms of the flight from
motherhood, and then slowly reformulated into a demand for enhanced
valuation of the institution, values, and work of nurturance, a dignitary
claim that was almost immediately interrogated as a suspect form of
"essentialism."" 7 The movement for gay pride has similarly reappropriated
and transvalued identity discourses and practices once only contemptu-
ously referred to by the epithet "queer."
In short, discourses about subordination and equality set up a rhetori-
cal framework in which we are continuously arguing about the ways
human dignity is expressed in a given social order. The abstract language
in which we express our principles or purposes can only point us to a
question whose concrete resolution has to be fought out in the field of
social life, with respect to a variety of different structures and meanings. It
seems to me uncontrovertable that at any given moment of history, mem-
bers of a society will experience many questions of status inequality, such
as slavery or lynching, as relatively uncontroversial. Yet there are bound to
be others about which there is deep social dissensus, such as "date rape,"
"meritocratic standards," or the ways we value child care. These
Of course, the tendency of emancipatory discourses to imagine equality in ways that tacitly
incorporate the status values of the culture they are criticizing has been the subject of much recent
commentary in the critical race literature. See, e.g., Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); see also WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER
AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY (1995) (examining how resistance discourses and oppositional
projects can incorporate discourses and values of the world they mean to subvert). Those who would
employ an emancipatory discourse always must be interrogating that discourse in an attempt to
ascertain whether its vision of equality rests on the value systems of an unjust status hierarchy. In
particular, members of subordinated groups who may simultaneously occupy positions of privilege in
other status orders must be vigilant in avoiding what I call "positional bias," or expressions of dignitary
harms or movement goals that reflect the social experience and concerns of the subordinated group's
more socially privileged members. "Essentialism" arising out of this kind of positional bias is in all
likelihood unavoidable, and just as inevitably will and should be challenged with the ongoing
contestation of social hierarchy. But the kind of essentialism I call "reification"---treating historically
or circumstantially contingent aspects of group experience as relevant to the articulation of equality
goals-seems to be an inevitable, and even necessary, part of the emancipatory project, so long as
generalizations about the socially specific circumstances and traits of the subordinated group are
treated as contingent and revisable. See Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 20, at 1211-17.
117. See id.
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controverted questions about the justice of our social practices set up a
normative struggle about which there may or may not ever emerge wide-
ranging social consensus. In short, there are many unanswered questions
nested in the general commitment to ameliorate unjust forms of group-
based stratification or subordination, perhaps as many unanswered ques-
tions as are nested in the commitment to color blindness. Posing these
questions in more concrete sociohistorical terms can fruitfully inform
debate and focus dispute about them without necessarily resolving the
matters in issue.
This is no doubt why Post suggests that the ends of judicial account-
ability and doctrinal coherence would be served by adoption of a socio-
logical approach to the field."' As my own work suggests, I am
simultaneously compelled by such claims and yet despairing of them. Fun-
damental questions concerning the distribution of dignitary and material
goods are at stake in disputes over antidiscrimination law. For just this rea-
son the capacity of a sociohistorical or sociological approach to clarify
positive and normative dimensions of the equality question may, in certain
contexts, prove to be a liability as well as a virtue. For example, even if the
"dominant approach" masks the actual operations of antidiscrimination
law, judges and other legal decision makers may not necessarily wish to
unmask them. The antidiscrimination narrative is, after all, a story told by
members of relatively privileged groups explaining why they are prepared
voluntarily to divest themselves of some of their status privileges. In a
variety of circumstances, legal decision makers may not in fact wish to
understand, acknowledge, or address the social dynamics that sustain the
inequality of groups."9
Implicit in the sociological approach is a second potential liability. As
we have seen, when considered from a sociological standpoint, the dis-
establishment of group inequality is a messy affair. Once we abandon
tropes of transcendence and understand that we are aspiring to destabilize
the social salience of race and gender without eradicating it, it is not
always clear what equality looks like or how we get there. Such ambigui-
ties are at the heart of recent disputes over sexual harassment law and por-
nography. The antidiscrimination literature now contains much discussion
of subordination, but less frequently acknowledges the kinds of controver-
sies that may arise in determining how particular practices "subordinate,"
118. See Post, supra note 1, at 30-40.
119. I espouse no simple determinism here, but observe only the uncontroversial: Social interest
and social position can play a role in predisposing decision makers, advocates, and scholars to certain
views about the appropriate ends of law. Cf. Siegel, Rule of Love, supra note 20, at 2180-81 (discussing
how judges can interpret law "in good faith" while at the same time interpreting law in ways that reflect
"selective sympathy and indifference" to certain social groups; observing that "[s]ometimes... critical
oblivion is bliss, especially when it is interest-convergent").
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or why they do so. 2' To avoid the complex and the contestable, both
judges and advocates may shy away from discussing the kinds of interpre-
tive and predictive judgments that support claims about equality and dis-
crimination, sociologically conceived. In short, in our political culture,
there are distinct advantages to maintaining the dominant conception. What
tropes of blindness may lack in descriptive accuracy, they more than com-
pensate for in familiar and uncontroversial rhetorical force.
Still, there is everything to be gained from wrestling with such large
questions from a more particularized sociological standpoint, so long as we
do so in full awareness of the positive and normative conflicts we are
bound to encounter along the way. For it is in the crucible of contests such
as these-high-stakes struggles at the intersection of social value and
social practice-that a society continually revises its understanding of
unjust status hierarchies and consequently opens its imaginative horizons
to new forms of social ordering. So it is that this society has struggled,
from generation to generation in times past, to reinvent itself in the more
perfect image of its commitment to freedom and equality. And so it is that
future generations of Americans will no doubt do so again.
120. Catharine MacKinnon first elaborated an antisubordination framework in the course of
demonstrating how sexual harassment was sex discrimination, and her booklength analysis of a
subordinating practice remains a model in the field. See MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra
note 104, at 117 (arguing that courts should evaluate contested practices with a view to determining
"whether the policy or practice in question integrally contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or
a deprived position because of gender status" and supplying detailed account of how sexual harassment
does so). As MacKinnon continued to explore how relations of subordination are enacted in different
forms of heterosexual sexual practice, her work generated increasing controversy. See, e.g., PLEASURE
AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984); Kathryn Abrams, Sex
Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L REV. 304, 329-46 (1995);
Harris, supra note 116, at 598-601; Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987). MacKinnon
surely is not alone in offering a close analysis of how particular practices subordinate. See, e.g., Charles
R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431
(1990); Mar J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for
the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1332 & n.10 (1991) (invoking methods of legal realism
and sociology of law in analyzing accent discrimination); Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note
20 (offering historical and contemporary analysis of abortion and its regulation that demonstrates how
social structure and social representation interact to construct and rationalize contested practice).
However, literature in the field often employs the discourse of subordination without acknowledging
the extent to which the project proposed involves this kind of contestable theorization of particular
practices. Cf Colker, supra note 105, at 1066 (arguing anti-subordination framework presents "hard
questions that cannot be addressed theoretically"; the article "set[s] forth a principle and a framework
under which we can begin to answer these questions" which can only be addressed "in specific factual
settings"). For one unusually forthright encounter with the complexities of elaborating an
antisubordination theory, see Tracy E. Higgins, "By Reason of Their Sex": Feminist Theory, Post
Modernism, and Justice, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1536, 1594 (1995) (urging Court and feminist legal
theorists to abandon arguments that "rely on prepolitical conceptions of gender difference" and
"acknowledge the exercise of power that is implicit in their own efforts to represent women politically
and linguistically").
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Are there risks in taking this historicizing vantage point on the inter-
pretive conflicts in which we will inevitably engage as we argue about how
to vindicate our normative commitments in our social practices? Abso-
lutely. Our political culture prizes rule-like simplicity in its standards and
individualism in its principles; the critical project to which this Lecture and
Response point promises neither. Neither Post nor I have attempted to
package the inquiries we have undertaken in doctrinal "bites." Indeed the
sociological turn, at least as we each have explored it here, would seem to
resist doctrinal assimilation precisely because it breaks from the ways that
the dominant tradition has figured the meaning of equality for so many
decades now.
But this seems to me as much a virtue as a vice. As one who read
MacKinnon and Bell in delight at their refusal to engage debate on the
terms law offered them, I want to defer conversation about exigencies of
advocacy long enough to wrestle again with what we can fathom of the
actual and the possible. For, as MacKinnon and Bell have so vividly dem-
onstrated for us, if we can liberate the imagination from law, it is possible
to enliven law with new imaginings. This, too, is doing law, for, in ways
more various than we can know, our intuitions about the justice of our
practices would seem to be narrative.12'
What, for me, is at stake in this critical encounter with the past? For
all the abstract argument of this essay, I might trace its roots to stories I
was told as child. My father first explained the civil rights movement, seg-
regation, and slavery to me in terms of the post-Holocaustal injunction
"Z'Chor," or Remember. In his stories, the forms of human injustice were
plural, particular, and incommensurable, yet illuminated each other in dis-
turbing ways. As I can now see, the questions his seemingly simple stories
raised for me then continue to haunt my work today.
What if it turns out that what matters most are the stories that shape
our intuitions of the just and reasonable, intuitions that theory and doctrine
then articulate as norms, principles, and rules? And what if one of the most
compelling of those stories in antidiscrimination law today is a certain nar-
rative of progress in which we stand as ethical sophisticates equipped with
vision and virtue that distinguishes us from our more ethically primitive
forebears? This story invites us to form our identifications and commit-
ments by repudiating the past, but can prove problematic precisely as it
does so. Knowing ourselves as unimplicated by the past invites the kind of
complacency that deadens the instinct to introspection and action both.
Moved perhaps by certain stories of my childhood, in my writing I
have worked to deflate the kind of confidence this narrative engenders, a
kind of confidence that comes from mistaking hindsight for a moral virtue
121. See Siegel, Collective Memory, supra note 20; see also BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE,
supra note 56, 203-10.
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rather than a critical vantage point.-'22 1 have tried to decipher the past by
asking, how are these ethically primitive forebears my forebears-that is,
how might past generations of Americans have lived in worlds genealogi-
cally-linked to, or sociolegally like, my own? For me, asking such ques-
tions gives the practice of remembering both an ethical and a political
dimension. No doubt, looking to the past and seeing continuity in the face
of change can be sobering, even paralyzing; yet is it any more risky than
looking to the past and seeing change in the face of continuity? As this
nation's experience in recent decades illustrates, confidence in the re-
demptive possibilities of change can engender forms of self-satisfaction
that may just as readily sap the collective will.
Without some awareness of our historical position, how are we to
wield the rhetorical tools with which we reason about the justice of any
community we might build? Even if this perspective on our project reveals
that our tools are blunt and flawed, aren't we better off trying to find our
way chastened by the knowledge that we, too, are fallible creatures whose
principles and judgments are culturally contingent than in proceeding in
willful disregard of that fact? Reckoning with our limitations need not
involve relinguishing responsibility. Rather it presents us with a problem
that is inescapably, perhaps even constitutively, human. As soon as a child
has learned to say--"I did it," "He did it," and then "He made me do it"-
she has learned how to represent herself in a discourse of causes and a dis-
course of effects. Henceforth, she has a choice, and with it, the narrative
resources in which to construct a self as acting or acted upon, agent, object,
or any mix of the two. For all the sophistication she may thereafter acquire
in representing herself to herself and to others, it is a choice that she can
never again refuse.
122. See Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 20, at 1146-48.
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